ACTION​ ​WITHOUT​ ​THE​ ​FIRST​ ​PERSON PERSPECTIVE Herman​ ​Cappelen​ ​and​ ​Josh​ ​Dever Draft​ ​October​ ​2017 In​ ​our​ ​book​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical​​ ​we​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​various​ ​theses​ ​of​ ​essential​ ​indexicality all​ ​fail.​ ​Indexicals​ ​are​ ​not​ ​essential,​ ​we​ ​conclude.​ ​One​ ​essentiality​ ​thesis​ ​we​ ​target​ ​in​ ​the​ ​third chapter​ ​is​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​indexical​ ​attitudes​ ​are​ ​essential​ ​for​ ​action.​ ​Our​ ​strategy​ ​is​ ​to​ ​give examples​ ​of​ ​what​ ​we​ ​call​ ​​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalizations​,​ ​which​ ​explain​ ​actions​ ​without​ ​citing indexical​ ​attitudes.​ ​To​ ​defeat​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​indexical​ ​attitudes​ ​are​ ​essential​ ​for​ ​action,​ ​it​ ​suffices that​ ​there​ ​could​ ​be​ ​even​ ​one​ ​successful​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalization.In​ ​what​ ​follows​ ​we bolster​ ​our​ ​case​ ​against​ ​an​ ​essential​ ​connection​ ​between​ ​action​ ​and​​ ​the​ ​de​ ​se​ ​​(or​ ​indexicality), first​ ​by​ ​developing​ ​a​ ​range​ ​of​ ​new​ ​action​ ​models​ ​and​ ​secondly​ ​by​ ​responding​ ​to​ ​challenges from​ ​Dilip​ ​Ninan,​ ​Stephan​ ​Torre,​ ​and​ ​​José​ ​Luis​ ​Bermúdez​. Action​ ​without​ ​the​ ​first​ ​person​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view The​ ​Inessentiality​ ​Thesis​ ​involves​ ​a​ ​modal​ ​claim​ ​concerning​ ​a​ ​necessary​ ​condition​ ​on​ ​action.​ ​In particular​ ​we​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​IIC​ ​is​ ​false: Impersonal​ ​Incompleteness​ ​Claim​ ​(IIC)​.​ ​Impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalizations​ ​(IAR)​ ​are necessarily​ ​incomplete​ ​because​ ​of​ ​a​ ​missing​ ​indexical​ ​component We​ ​imagine​ ​a​ ​proponent​ ​of​ ​IIC​ ​claiming​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​below​ ​​must be​ ​incomplete,​ ​while​ ​the​ ​Personal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​is​ ​or​ ​could​ ​be​ ​complete: Personal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​(explanation)​ ​1. •​ ​Belief​ ​:​ ​François​ ​is​ ​about​ ​to​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Belief​ ​:​ ​I​ ​am​ ​François. •​ ​Belief​ ​(Inferred)​ ​:​ ​I​ ​am​ ​about​ ​to​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Desire​ ​:​ ​I​ ​not​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Belief​ ​:​ ​If​ ​I​ ​duck​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table,​ ​I​ ​will​ ​not​ ​be​ ​shot. 1 •​ ​Action​ ​:​ ​I​ ​duck​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table. Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​(explanation)​ ​1. •​ ​Belief​ ​:​ ​François​ ​is​ ​about​ ​to​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Desire​ ​:​ ​François​ ​not​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Belief​ ​:​ ​If​ ​François​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table,​ ​he​ ​will​ ​not​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Action​ ​:​ ​François​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table. We​ ​say​ ​there​ ​are​ ​perfectly​ ​good​ ​Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalizations.​ ​So​ ​far​ ​this​ ​is​ ​about explanations​ ​or​ ​rationalizations.​ ​Our​ ​point​ ​is​ ​also​ ​metaphysical:​ ​an​ ​agent's​ ​action​ ​need​ ​not involve​ ​any​ ​first-personal​ ​representations.​ ​For​ ​example,she​ ​need​ ​not​ ​represent​ ​herself,​ ​qua herself,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​acting​ ​agent,​ ​nor​ ​does​ ​she​ ​need​ ​to​ ​represent​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​her​ ​body​ ​that​ ​acts​ ​on​ ​the world​ ​as​ ​her​ ​body​ ​(in​ ​a​ ​first-personal​ ​way ). 1 Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model In​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical,​ ​​we​ ​presented​ ​one​ ​version​ ​of​ ​how​ ​Inessentiality​ ​could​ ​be implemented:​ ​the​ ​Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model. The​ ​Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model.​​ ​Every​ ​agent​ ​has​ ​a​ ​very​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​third-person​ ​beliefs and​ ​desires​ ​that​ ​give​ ​rise​ ​to​ ​third-person​ ​intentions,​ ​which​ ​in​ ​turn​ ​rationalize​ ​or​ ​motivate actions​ ​(via​ ​their​ ​recognition).​ ​Not​ ​all​ ​of​ ​these​ ​intentions​ ​are​ ​going​ ​to​ ​produce​ ​action,​ ​at least​ ​in​ ​normal​ ​cases​ ​(perhaps​ ​​ ​a​ ​god's​ ​intentions​ ​would).​ ​These​ ​failures​ ​occur​ ​​ ​because a​ ​given​ ​agent​ ​has​ ​an​ ​"action​ ​inventory":​ ​a​ ​range​ ​of​ ​actions​ ​that​ ​he​ ​can​ ​perform.​ ​An​ ​agent constantly​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​match​ ​his​ ​intentions​ ​with​ ​his​ ​action​ ​inventory,​ ​and​ ​when​ ​he​ ​notices​ ​a match,​ ​action​ ​occurs.​ ​When​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​match,​ ​the​ ​intention​ ​idles,​ ​and​ ​doesn't​ ​motivate​ ​or rationalize​ ​action.​ ​So​ ​the​ ​Selection​ ​Problem ​ ​is​ ​solved​ ​by​ ​appealing​ ​to​ ​the​ ​physical​ ​or 2 psychological​ ​constraints​ ​of​ ​the​ ​agent:​ ​only​ ​certain​ ​actions​ ​result​ ​because​ ​only​ ​certain actions​ ​were​ ​available​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​place. The​ ​inclusion​ ​of​ ​this​ ​one​ ​illustration​ ​of​ ​how​ ​Inessentiality​ ​could​ ​be​ ​implemented​ ​was presentationally​ ​unfortunate:​ ​it​ ​gave​ ​the​ ​impression​ ​that​ ​this​ ​was​ ​how​ ​we​ ​thought​ ​action happened​ ​or​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model​ ​was​ ​the​ ​​only​​ ​way​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​how​ ​actions​ ​could happen​ ​without​ ​appealing​ ​to​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​attitudes.​ ​That's​ ​not​ ​what​ ​we​ ​think.​ ​We​ ​think​ ​there​ ​are literally​ ​infinitely​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​one​ ​can​ ​explain​ ​how​ ​one​ ​could​ ​act​ ​without​ ​de​ ​se​ ​representations. We​ ​outline​ ​a​ ​few​ ​below,​ ​but​ ​before​ ​giving​ ​more​ ​cases,​ ​here's​ ​a​ ​general​ ​recipe​ ​for​ ​how​ ​to​ ​get from​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​action​ ​that​ ​includes​ ​an​ ​essential​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​the​ ​de​ ​se​ ​attitudes​ ​to​ ​an​ ​alternative 1 ​ ​This​ ​'in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​person​ ​way'​ ​is​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​talking​ ​employed​ ​by​ ​those​ ​who​ ​defend​ ​Essentiality​ ​Thesis:​ ​it's supposed​ ​to​ ​distinguish​ ​Nora​ ​thinking​ ​of​ ​her​ ​hand​ ​by​ ​thinking​ ​of​ ​it​ ​as​ ​Nora's​ ​hand​ ​vs​ ​thinking​ ​of​ ​it​ ​as​ ​​her hand​ ​(the​ ​italics​ ​on​ ​'her'​ ​is​ ​supposed​ ​to​ ​make​ ​forceful​ ​the​ ​perspectival​ ​reading).​ ​It's​ ​hard​ ​for​ ​us​ ​to sympathize​ ​with​ ​the​ ​difficulties​ ​of​ ​articulating​ ​this​ ​idea​ ​since​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​think​ ​there's​ ​anything​ ​here​ ​to articulate:​ ​so​ ​we​ ​take​ ​the​ ​hardness​ ​of​ ​stating​ ​the​ ​position​ ​as​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​its​ ​problem. 2 ​ ​Note​ ​on​ ​what​ ​selection​ ​problem​ ​is.... 2 non-de-se​ ​model.​ ​Just​ ​take​ ​out​ ​the​ ​de​ ​se​ ​component​ ​of​ ​your​ ​view,​ ​and​ ​as​ ​a​ ​replacement, assume​ ​that​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​god​ ​that​ ​bridges​ ​the​ ​gap,​ ​i.e.​ ​does​ ​what​ ​the​ ​work​ ​that​ ​the​ ​de​ ​se​ ​attitudes were​ ​supposed​ ​to​ ​do​ ​for​ ​you​ ​(so​ ​whatever​ ​theoretical​ ​and​ ​explanatory​ ​work​ ​the​ ​de​ ​se​ ​attitudes were​ ​doing,​ ​god​ ​does.).​ ​God​ ​might​ ​do​ ​this​ ​in​ ​different​ ​ways:​ ​she​ ​might​ ​use​ ​neurology,​ ​magic spells,​ ​send​ ​out​ ​angels,​ ​or​ ​use​ ​little​ ​gnomes​ ​to​ ​do​ ​the​ ​work. More​ ​non-de-se​ ​Models​ ​of​ ​Action François​ ​is​ ​about​ ​to​ ​be​ ​shot,​ ​but​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table​ ​just​ ​in​ ​time​ ​and​ ​avoids​ ​the​ ​bullet.​ ​How did​ ​this​ ​action​ ​come​ ​about?​ ​The​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​story​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​full​ ​story​ ​about​ ​how​ ​it​ ​came​ ​about​ ​​must include​ ​certain​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires:​ ​​first-personal​​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires.​ ​François​ ​needs​ ​to believe​ ​that​ ​​he​ ​himself​​ ​is​ ​about​ ​to​ ​be​ ​shot,​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​ducking​ ​under​ ​that​ ​table​ ​near​ ​​him himself​​ ​will​ ​save​ ​him,​ ​desire​ ​that​ ​​he​ ​himself​ ​​not​ ​get​ ​shot,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​on. We've​ ​claimed,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​contrary,​ ​that​ ​none​ ​of​ ​these​ ​special​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​are necessary.​ ​We're​ ​happy​ ​with​ ​a​ ​stripped-down​ ​account​ ​of​ ​how​ ​François'​ ​action​ ​came​ ​about.​ ​As long​ ​as​ ​François​ ​has​ ​some​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​that​ ​rationally​ ​integrate​ ​to​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​the​ ​action François​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table​,​ ​François​ ​has​ ​what​ ​he​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​act.​ ​We'll​ ​thus​ ​in​ ​many​ ​cases​ ​be happy​ ​with​ ​strict​ ​subsets​ ​of​ ​the​ ​explanations​ ​given​ ​by​ ​fans​ ​of​ ​the​ ​​de​ ​se​.​ ​Strip​ ​away​ ​all​ ​of​ ​the first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires,​ ​and​ ​there's​ ​still​ ​a​ ​perfectly​ ​good​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​action. But​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​nice​ ​if​ ​things​ ​didn't​ ​just​ ​devolve​ ​into​ ​clashing​ ​judgments​ ​about​ ​which explanations​ ​are​ ​good.​ ​Thus​ ​in​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical​,​ ​we​ ​also​ ​gave​ ​a​ ​picture​ ​of​ ​how​ ​action could​​ ​work​​ ​such​ ​that​ ​our​ ​trimmed-down​ ​explanations​ ​would​ ​be​ ​good​ ​ones.​ ​This​ ​was​ ​our​ ​Action Inventory​ ​Model.​ ​The​ ​Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model​ ​has​ ​attracted​ ​considerable​ ​critical​ ​attention​ ​in discussion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​book,​ ​so​ ​we​ ​want​ ​to​ ​clarify​ ​its​ ​role.​ ​The​ ​AIM​ ​was​ ​intended​ ​as​ ​a​ ​​proof​ ​of concept​.​ ​The​ ​point​ ​was​ ​not​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​how​ ​human​ ​action​ ​works,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​this is​ ​one​ ​way​ ​action​ ​​could​ ​work​,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​if​ ​it​ ​did​ ​work​ ​that​ ​way,​ ​what​ ​we​ ​call​ ​impersonal​ ​action explanations​ ​would​ ​be​ ​perfectly​ ​good​ ​full​ ​explanations.​ ​But​ ​once​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​is​ ​proved,​ ​it​ ​can​ ​be implemented​ ​in​ ​many​ ​different​ ​ways.​ ​Consider​ ​some​ ​more​ ​ways​ ​that​ ​action​ ​could​ ​proceed​ ​in​ ​the absence​ ​of​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​or​ ​desires: 1. In​ ​an​ ​occasionalist​ ​world,​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​direct​ ​causation​ ​between​ ​objects.​ ​When​ ​billiard​ ​ball B1​ ​hits​ ​billiard​ ​ball​ ​B2,​ ​the​ ​impact​ ​doesn't​ ​cause​ ​B2​ ​to​ ​start​ ​moving.​ ​Rather,​ ​all​ ​causation comes​ ​from​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god.​ ​When​ ​God​ ​sees​ ​B1​ ​hit​ ​B2,​ ​God​ ​causes​ ​B1​ ​to​ ​stop moving​ ​and​ ​B2​ ​to​ ​start​ ​moving.​ ​The​ ​occasionalist​ ​god​ ​sustains​ ​human​ ​action​ ​as​ ​well. When​ ​God​ ​sees​ ​that​ ​Jones​ ​wants​ ​a​ ​beer,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​Jones​ ​believes​ ​there​ ​are​ ​beers​ ​in​ ​the refrigerator,​ ​God​ ​causes​ ​Jones​ ​to​ ​go​ ​to​ ​the​ ​refrigerator. The​ ​causal​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​world​ ​is​ ​different​ ​from​ ​the​ ​causal​ ​structure​ ​of our​ ​world,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​​looks​​ ​the​ ​same​ ​as​ ​in​ ​our​ ​world.​ ​Jones​ ​wants​ ​a​ ​beer,​ ​thinks​ ​there​ ​are beers​ ​in​ ​the​ ​fridge,​ ​and​ ​goes​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fridge.​ ​We​ ​think​ ​Jones​ ​​acts​​ ​in​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​world 3 just​ ​as​ ​much​ ​as​ ​in​ ​our​ ​world.​ ​(After​ ​all,​ ​our​ ​world​ ​could​ ​turn​ ​out​ ​to​ ​be​ ​an​ ​occasionalist world.)​ ​But​ ​in​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​world,​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​aren't​ ​necessary.​ ​That's because​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god​ ​is​ ​a​ ​helpful​ ​one.​ ​Suppose​ ​François​ ​believes​ ​​François​ ​is​ ​in danger​​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​​François​ ​​ ​not​ ​be​ ​in​ ​danger​.​ ​That's​ ​enough​ ​for​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god: she​ ​then​ ​sends​ ​François​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table.​ ​There​ ​could​ ​have​ ​been​ ​a​ ​less​ ​helpful occasionalist​ ​god.​ ​The​ ​less​ ​helpful​ ​god​ ​won't​ ​send​ ​François​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table​ ​unless François​ ​​also​​ ​believes​ ​​I​ ​am​ ​François​.​ ​But​ ​it​ ​doesn't​ ​have​ ​to​ ​be​ ​that​ ​way.​ ​There's​ ​nothing wrong​ ​with​ ​the​ ​helpful​ ​occasionalist​ ​god,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​the​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​helpful​ ​occasionalist god,​ ​François​ ​acts​ ​without​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs. Similarly,​ ​there​ ​could​ ​have​ ​been​ ​an​ ​​epistemically​ ​demanding​​ ​occasionalist​ ​god.​ ​The epistemically​ ​demanding​ ​god​ ​won't​ ​send​ ​François​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table​ ​unless​ ​François​ ​not only​ ​believes,​ ​but​ ​actually​ ​​knows​,​ ​that​ ​François​ ​is​ ​in​ ​danger.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​world​ ​of​ ​the epistemically​ ​demanding​ ​god,​ ​explanations​ ​of​ ​action​ ​require​ ​appeals​ ​to​ ​knowledge. That's​ ​of​ ​course​ ​one​ ​way​ ​that​ ​acting​ ​could​ ​be,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​it​ ​could​ ​be​ ​that​ ​way doesn't​ ​alter​ ​the​ ​other​ ​real​ ​possibility​ ​that​ ​actions​ ​could​ ​come​ ​from​ ​beliefs​ ​that​ ​aren't knowledge. 2.​ ​Normally​ ​when​ ​we​ ​act,​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​how​ ​things​ ​are​ ​around​ ​us.​ ​If​ ​you​ ​want to​ ​get​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​from​ ​the​ ​refrigerator,​ ​you​ ​need​ ​to​ ​know​ ​where​ ​the​ ​refrigerator​ ​is​ ​in​ ​relation to​ ​you,​ ​so​ ​that​ ​you​ ​can​ ​get​ ​your​ ​hand​ ​to​ ​the​ ​right​ ​place.​ ​But​ ​that's​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​contingent limitations​ ​on​ ​our​ ​abilities.​ ​Consider​ ​the​ ​absent-minded​ ​CEO​ ​Jeeve​ ​Stobs.​ ​Stobs​ ​is​ ​too distracted​ ​plotting​ ​the​ ​future​ ​of​ ​cloud​ ​computing​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​such​ ​mundania​ ​as where​ ​he​ ​is​ ​and​ ​where​ ​his​ ​beers​ ​are.​ ​To​ ​avoid​ ​death​ ​by​ ​dehydration,​ ​Stobs​ ​has​ ​hired​ ​a collection​ ​of​ ​assistants.​ ​So​ ​when​ ​Stobs​ ​wants​ ​a​ ​beer,​ ​he​ ​just​ ​says,​ ​"Beer!",​ ​and​ ​one​ ​of his​ ​assistants​ ​locates​ ​a​ ​beer,​ ​gets​ ​it,​ ​and​ ​brings​ ​it​ ​to​ ​him.​ ​They​ ​are​ ​very​ ​helpful assistants.​ ​It's​ ​not​ ​just​ ​beers​ ​--​ ​Stobs​ ​can​ ​say​ ​"Call​ ​Zark​ ​Muckerberg!",​ ​and​ ​an​ ​assistant will​ ​find​ ​a​ ​phone,​ ​place​ ​the​ ​call,​ ​and​ ​give​ ​the​ ​phone​ ​to​ ​Stobs.​ ​Stobs​ ​can​ ​say​ ​"Go​ ​to​ ​Palo Alto!",​ ​and​ ​an​ ​assistant​ ​will​ ​carry​ ​him​ ​to​ ​a​ ​car​ ​and​ ​drive​ ​him​ ​to​ ​Palo​ ​Alto. So​ ​Stobs​ ​has​ ​no​ ​need​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​around​ ​him.​ ​He​ ​doesn't​ ​need​ ​to know​ ​where​ ​things​ ​are​ ​to​ ​act​ ​on​ ​them,​ ​because​ ​his​ ​assistants​ ​will​ ​find​ ​things​ ​when​ ​he requests​ ​them.​ ​(Does​ ​he​ ​at​ ​least​ ​need​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​where​ ​his​ ​assistants​ ​are?​ ​No. They​ ​make​ ​sure​ ​to​ ​stay​ ​nearby​ ​at​ ​all​ ​times.​ ​Of​ ​course,​ ​if​ ​flukishly​ ​they're​ ​out​ ​of​ ​hearing, his​ ​intentions​ ​won't​ ​manifest​ ​in​ ​action.​ ​But​ ​all​ ​of​ ​us​ ​are,​ ​under​ ​unlikely​ ​unfriendly circumstances,​ ​liable​ ​to​ ​have​ ​our​ ​intentions​ ​not​ ​manifest​ ​in​ ​action.) We​ ​can​ ​imagine​ ​Stobs​ ​getting​ ​saddled​ ​with​ ​an​ ​unhelpful​ ​assistant,​ ​who​ ​won't​ ​bring Stobs​ ​the​ ​beer​ ​unless​ ​he's​ ​sure​ ​that​ ​Stobs​ ​himself​ ​has​ ​a​ ​belief,​ ​or​ ​a​ ​true​ ​belief,​ ​or knowledge​ ​of,​ ​or​ ​direct​ ​line​ ​of​ ​sight​ ​on,​ ​where​ ​the​ ​beer​ ​is​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​him.​ ​When​ ​Stobs has​ ​such​ ​an​ ​unhelpful​ ​assistant,​ ​he​ ​will​ ​be​ ​incapable​ ​of​ ​action​ ​without​ ​a​ ​first-personal belief,​ ​or​ ​first-personal​ ​knowledge,​ ​or​ ​direct​ ​perceptual​ ​evidence.​ ​That​ ​is​ ​indeed​ ​how​ ​it 4 could​ ​be.​ ​But​ ​again,​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​it​ ​could​ ​be​ ​that​ ​way​ ​doesn't​ ​interfere​ ​with​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​it could​ ​also​ ​be​ ​other​ ​ways,​ ​ways​ ​that​ ​don't​ ​create​ ​any​ ​need​ ​for​ ​first-personal​ ​states. Should​ ​we​ ​worry​ ​that​ ​Stobs​ ​still​ ​needs​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action​ ​of ordering​ ​his​ ​assistants​?​ ​(He​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​know​ ​where​ ​his​ ​mouth​ ​is​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​him,​ ​for example,​ ​to​ ​use​ ​it​ ​in​ ​speaking.​ ​If​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​button​ ​to​ ​summon​ ​an​ ​assistant,​ ​he​ ​needs​ ​to know​ ​where​ ​that​ ​is​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​him.)​ ​Suppose​ ​this​ ​gets​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​problem​ ​--​ ​Stobs​ ​is​ ​so absent-minded​ ​that​ ​he​ ​can't​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​how​ ​to​ ​notify​ ​his​ ​assistants​ ​that​ ​he's​ ​got​ ​an intention.​ ​So​ ​the​ ​assistants​ ​set​ ​up​ ​brain-monitoring​ ​equipment​ ​so​ ​that​ ​they​ ​can​ ​directly supervise​ ​Stobs's​ ​mental​ ​states.​ ​Now​ ​when​ ​they​ ​see​ ​Stobs​ ​wanting​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a​ ​call,​ ​they bring​ ​him​ ​the​ ​phone.​ ​There's​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​him​ ​to​ ​get​ ​his​ ​mouth​ ​into​ ​motion,​ ​or​ ​to​ ​push​ ​a button. 3.​ ​You​ ​might​ ​worry​ ​that​ ​our​ ​first​ ​case,​ ​with​ ​François​ ​and​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god,​ ​smuggles in​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs.​ ​Maybe​ ​François​ ​doesn't​ ​need​ ​to​ ​have​ ​them,​ ​but​ ​what​ ​about​ ​the occasionalist​ ​god?​ ​This​ ​worry​ ​doesn't​ ​actually​ ​matter​ ​for​ ​that​ ​case.​ ​Even​ ​if​ ​the occasionalist​ ​god​ ​does​ ​need​ ​to​ ​have​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​to​ ​act,​ ​if​ ​François​ ​doesn't,​ ​then we​ ​have​ ​a​ ​counterexample​ ​to​ ​(IIC),​ ​and​ ​one​ ​counterexample​ ​is​ ​all​ ​we​ ​need. 3 But​ ​adding​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​to​ ​the​ ​god​ ​is​ ​unnecessary.​ ​Gods,​ ​being​ ​gods,​ ​can​ ​act​ ​in ways​ ​that​ ​we​ ​can't.​ ​When​ ​we​ ​want​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​from​ ​the​ ​refrigerator,​ ​we​ ​need​ ​a​ ​plan,​ ​setting in​ ​motion​ ​a​ ​sequence​ ​of​ ​things​ ​sufficiently​ ​proximal​ ​to​ ​one​ ​another​ ​bridging​ ​the​ ​gap between​ ​us​ ​and​ ​the​ ​refrigerator.​ ​That's​ ​because​ ​of​ ​contingent​ ​limitations​ ​on​ ​our capacities.​ ​But​ ​gods​ ​aren't​ ​so​ ​limited.​ ​When​ ​a​ ​god​ ​wants​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​from​ ​the​ ​refrigerator, there's​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​moving​ ​of​ ​hands,​ ​or​ ​opening​ ​of​ ​refrigerator​ ​doors,​ ​or​ ​uncapping​ ​of beer​ ​bottles.​ ​How​ ​do​ ​gods​ ​act?​ ​Well,​ ​who​ ​knows?​ ​But​ ​maybe​ ​like​ ​this:​ ​gods​ ​just​ ​have direct​ ​control​ ​over​ ​the​ ​state​ ​of​ ​reality,​ ​so​ ​for​ ​a​ ​god,​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​gap​ ​between​ ​​intending​ ​that p​​ ​and​ ​​it's​ ​being​ ​the​ ​case​ ​that​ ​p​.​ ​So​ ​when​ ​a​ ​god​ ​wants​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​to​ ​be​ ​on​ ​the​ ​table,​ ​he simply​ ​intends​ ​​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​on​ ​the​ ​table​,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​thing​ ​is​ ​done.​ ​Why​ ​would​ ​there​ ​be any​ ​need​ ​for​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​for​ ​such​ ​a​ ​god? Such​ ​gods​ ​don't​ ​have​ ​any​ ​need​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​their​ ​own​ ​capacities,​ ​either,​ ​because there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​limit​ ​on​ ​those​ ​capacities.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​could​ ​imagine​ ​as​ ​well​ ​somewhat​ ​more humble​ ​demigods.​ ​The​ ​demigods​ ​also​ ​act​ ​simply​ ​by​ ​intending,​ ​but​ ​their​ ​powers​ ​don't allow​ ​them​ ​to​ ​realize​ ​just​ ​any​ ​intention,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​certain​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​intentions.​ ​Semiramis can​ ​get​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​on​ ​the​ ​table​ ​just​ ​by​ ​intending​ ​that​ ​there​ ​be​ ​a​ ​beer​ ​on​ ​the​ ​table,​ ​but​ ​can't 3​ ​Perhaps​ ​François​ ​doesn't​ ​really​ ​act​ ​here,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​François​ ​and​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god​ ​act​ ​together?​ ​But​ ​we​ ​can push​ ​the​ ​theology​ ​in​ ​a​ ​more​ ​and​ ​more​ ​impersonal​ ​direction,​ ​making​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god​ ​less​ ​like​ ​another​ ​acting agent​ ​and​ ​more​ ​like​ ​a​ ​sustaining​ ​first-causal​ ​force.​ ​Perhaps​ ​(IIC)​ ​can​ ​be​ ​weakened​ ​to​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​for​ ​every​ ​action, someone​ ​somewhere​ ​must​ ​have​ ​a​ ​first-personal​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​features​ ​in​ ​the​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​that​ ​action?​ ​It's​ ​not​ ​clear that​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god's​ ​putative​ ​first-personal​ ​states​ ​have​ ​to​ ​be​ ​mentioned​ ​in​ ​the​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​François'​ ​action (hard​ ​questions​ ​about​ ​what​ ​counts​ ​as​ ​a​ ​​full​​ ​explanation​ ​come​ ​up​ ​here),​ ​but​ ​even​ ​if​ ​they​ ​do,​ ​it's​ ​also​ ​unclear​ ​whether this​ ​weakened​ ​(IIC)​ ​is​ ​particularly​ ​interesting.​ ​We're​ ​in​ ​danger​ ​of​ ​having​ ​a​ ​connection​ ​to​ ​action​ ​that's​ ​weak​ ​enough that​ ​just​ ​about​ ​any​ ​belief​ ​will​ ​have​ ​that​ ​connection. 5 get​ ​a​ ​biscuit​ ​on​ ​the​ ​sideboard​ ​just​ ​by​ ​intending​ ​that​ ​there​ ​be​ ​a​ ​biscuit​ ​on​ ​the​ ​sideboard. So​ ​do​ ​demigods​ ​need​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​what​ ​they​ ​can​ ​and​ ​can't​ ​directly​ ​do,​ ​and​ ​does​ ​that require​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs?​ ​(Again,​ ​as​ ​long​ ​as​ ​we've​ ​got​ ​the​ ​gods,​ ​it​ ​wouldn't​ ​matter for​ ​our​ ​purposes​ ​if​ ​the​ ​demigods​ ​required​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs.​ ​But​ ​they​ ​don't.) No.​ ​Maybe​ ​Semiramis​ ​is​ ​just​ ​an​ ​inveterate​ ​optimist.​ ​She​ ​doesn't​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​what​ ​she can​ ​and​ ​can't​ ​do​ ​--​ ​she​ ​just​ ​intends​ ​willy-nilly,​ ​and​ ​sometimes​ ​action​ ​results​ ​from​ ​those intentions​ ​and​ ​other​ ​times​ ​it​ ​doesn't.​ ​Or​ ​maybe​ ​Semiramis​ ​has​ ​undergone​ ​Pavlovian training​ ​to​ ​restrict​ ​what​ ​intentions​ ​she​ ​forms.​ ​When​ ​she​ ​forms​ ​biscuit-y​ ​intentions,​ ​she experiences​ ​a​ ​painful​ ​electric​ ​shock,​ ​but​ ​when​ ​she​ ​forms​ ​beer-y​ ​intentions,​ ​she​ ​receives a​ ​reward​ ​of​ ​ambrosia.​ ​Without​ ​coming​ ​to​ ​have​ ​​beliefs​ ​or​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​about the​ ​boundaries​,​ ​her​ ​dispositions​ ​to​ ​intend​ ​can​ ​just​ ​be​ ​shaped​ ​in​ ​such​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​she​ ​no longer​ ​intends​ ​where​ ​her​ ​divine​ ​capacities​ ​give​ ​out.​ ​Or​ ​maybe​ ​one​ ​of​ ​her​ ​divinely realizable​ ​intentions​ ​was​ ​that​ ​​Semiramis​ ​intend​ ​only​ ​what​ ​she​ ​can​ ​directly​ ​do​,​ ​and​ ​she so​ ​intended​ ​early​ ​in​ ​life.​ ​Later,​ ​we'll​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​we​ ​are​ ​ourselves​ ​can​ ​be​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​as demigods​ ​of​ ​sorts. 4.​ ​You​ ​might​ ​have​ ​similar​ ​worries​ ​about​ ​Stobs​ ​and​ ​his​ ​assistants.​ ​Doesn't​ ​this​ ​example just​ ​push​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​back​ ​a​ ​step?​ ​After​ ​all,​ ​the​ ​​assistants​​ ​will​ ​need​ ​first-personal beliefs.​ ​As​ ​with​ ​the​ ​gods,​ ​we​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​irrelevant​ ​even​ ​if​ ​true​ ​--​ ​we​ ​still​ ​get​ ​Stobs as​ ​a​ ​counterexample​ ​to​ ​(IIC).​ ​But​ ​suppose​ ​corporate​ ​structure​ ​gets​ ​complicated.​ ​The demands​ ​on​ ​the​ ​assistants​ ​become​ ​so​ ​large​ ​that​ ​the​ ​assistants​ ​get​ ​their​ ​own​ ​assistants, and​ ​defer​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​their​ ​actions​ ​to​ ​their​ ​second-order​ ​assistants.​ ​Problems,​ ​of course,​ ​just​ ​pushed​ ​back​ ​one​ ​more​ ​step.​ ​But​ ​then​ ​we​ ​add​ ​another​ ​level​ ​of​ ​assistants, and​ ​another,​ ​and​ ​another.​ ​Suppose​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​an​ ​infinite​ ​sequence​ ​of​ ​assistants.​ ​Then Stobs​ ​intends​ ​that​ ​Kim​ ​Took​ ​be​ ​fired.​ ​Assistant​ ​A1​ ​carries​ ​out​ ​that​ ​intention,​ ​by​ ​forming​ ​a plan​ ​that​ ​(e.g.)​ ​requires​ ​the​ ​writing​ ​of​ ​an​ ​email.​ ​Assistant​ ​A2​ ​is​ ​then​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​the writing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​email,​ ​and​ ​forms​ ​a​ ​plan​ ​that​ ​requires​ ​turning​ ​on​ ​the​ ​computer.​ ​Assistant​ ​A3 now​ ​steps​ ​in,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​on.​ ​(Perhaps​ ​this​ ​is​ ​a​ ​gunky​ ​world,​ ​in​ ​which​ ​causal​ ​paths​ ​always decompose​ ​into​ ​smaller​ ​causal​ ​subpaths,​ ​so​ ​that​ ​the​ ​sequence​ ​of​ ​assistants​ ​maps​ ​onto the​ ​downward​ ​sequence​ ​of​ ​causal​ ​subpaths.)​ ​Every​ ​assistant​ ​has​ ​his​ ​own​ ​assistant,​ ​so we​ ​never​ ​reach​ ​a​ ​level​ ​of​ ​assistants​ ​acting​ ​unassisted.​ ​Would​ ​action​ ​result?​ ​Infinite regresses​ ​are​ ​always​ ​tricky​ ​to​ ​assess,​ ​be​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​see​ ​why​ ​not.​ ​The​ ​fan​ ​of​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​beliefs should,​ ​we​ ​think,​ ​say​ ​that​ ​action​ ​will​ ​result​ ​if​ ​we​ ​liberally​ ​sprinkle​ ​first-personal​ ​states along​ ​the​ ​regress.​ ​So​ ​if​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​problem​ ​here,​ ​it's​ ​not​ ​in​ ​the​ ​regress​ ​itself,​ ​but​ ​in​ ​the lack​ ​of​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs.​ ​And​ ​then​ ​we​ ​think​ ​that​ ​the​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​example​ ​shows that​ ​the​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​are​ ​inessential. The​ ​assistants​ ​form​ ​a​ ​downward​ ​chain,​ ​but​ ​we​ ​could​ ​also​ ​have​ ​an​ ​upward​ ​chain. François​ ​intends​ ​to​ ​duck​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table.​ ​The​ ​occasionalist​ ​god,​ ​monitoring​ ​the​ ​situation, spots​ ​this​ ​intention​ ​and​ ​puts​ ​it​ ​into​ ​action​ ​by​ ​bringing​ ​it​ ​about​ ​that​ ​François​ ​ducks​ ​under the​ ​table.​ ​Thus​ ​François​ ​acts.​ ​But​ ​why​ ​and​ ​how​ ​does​ ​the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god​ ​act?​ ​Well, the​ ​occasionalist​ ​god​ ​intends​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​it​ ​about​ ​that​ ​François​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table.​ ​And 6 the​ ​occasionalist​ ​metagod,​ ​monitoring​ ​the​ ​situation,​ ​spots​ ​this​ ​intention​ ​of​ ​the​ ​first​ ​god and​ ​puts​ ​it​ ​into​ ​action​ ​by​ ​bringing​ ​it​ ​about​ ​that​ ​the​ ​god​ ​bring​ ​it​ ​about​ ​that​ ​François​ ​ducks under​ ​the​ ​table.​ ​And​ ​why/how​ ​does​ ​the​ ​metagod​ ​act?​ ​Well,​ ​there's​ ​this​ ​metametagod watching​ ​things.​ ​And​ ​so​ ​on.​ ​We​ ​get​ ​an​ ​infinite​ ​sequence​ ​of​ ​monitoring​ ​gods,​ ​each​ ​one ready​ ​to​ ​plug​ ​any​ ​"gap"​ ​between​ ​intention​ ​and​ ​action.​ ​Or​ ​maybe​ ​there​ ​are​ ​only​ ​two​ ​gods (Lewis's​ ​two​ ​gods,​ ​perhaps.)​ ​Each​ ​one​ ​monitors​ ​the​ ​other,​ ​and​ ​brings​ ​it​ ​about​ ​that intentions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​result​ ​in​ ​action.​ ​Of​ ​course,​ ​their​ ​bringing​ ​it​ ​about​ ​is​ ​itself​ ​an​ ​action realizing​ ​their​ ​intention​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​it​ ​about,​ ​and​ ​is​ ​thus​ ​brought​ ​about​ ​by​ ​the​ ​other​ ​god. 5.​ ​We​ ​are​ ​building​ ​Robbie​ ​the​ ​Robot.​ ​Robbie​ ​has​ ​a​ ​collection​ ​of​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​he​ ​can perform​ ​--​ ​rotating​ ​and​ ​moving​ ​various​ ​appendages.​ ​These​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​triggered just​ ​by​ ​activating​ ​electrical​ ​current​ ​along​ ​various​ ​wires,​ ​and​ ​we​ ​have​ ​hard-coded programming​ ​in​ ​Robbie's​ ​software​ ​and​ ​hardware​ ​for​ ​activating​ ​that​ ​current.​ ​We​ ​then program​ ​up​ ​more​ ​complex​ ​actions​ ​--​ ​sequences​ ​of​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​that​ ​we​ ​label​ ​"lift"​ ​or "run"​ ​or​ ​"walk",​ ​and​ ​that​ ​we​ ​set​ ​to​ ​be​ ​triggered​ ​by​ ​certain​ ​program​ ​methods. Next​ ​we​ ​build​ ​a​ ​belief​ ​system​ ​for​ ​Robbie.​ ​Robbie​ ​has​ ​some​ ​perceptual​ ​systems:​ ​visual and​ ​auditory​ ​receptors.​ ​We​ ​use​ ​those​ ​to​ ​give​ ​Robbie​ ​an​ ​objective​ ​map​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world. Robbie​ ​also​ ​receives​ ​GPS​ ​signals,​ ​and​ ​integrates​ ​those​ ​signals​ ​with​ ​the​ ​perceptual inputs​ ​to​ ​create​ ​a​ ​partial​ ​map​ ​with​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​system​ ​centered​ ​on,​ ​say,​ ​the​ ​earth's center,​ ​and​ ​with​ ​objects​ ​placed​ ​at​ ​different​ ​coordinates.​ ​Among​ ​the​ ​things​ ​Robbie​ ​tracks coordinates​ ​for​ ​are​ ​Robbie​ ​himself,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​various​ ​appendages​ ​of​ ​Robbie.​ ​(But Robbie​ ​himself​ ​isn't​ ​represented​ ​any​ ​differently​ ​in​ ​the​ ​map​ ​from​ ​other​ ​objects.​ ​It's​ ​just one​ ​more​ ​thing,​ ​tagged​ ​with​ ​a​ ​label​ ​"R".) Now​ ​we​ ​can​ ​program​ ​even​ ​more​ ​complex​ ​actions​ ​for​ ​Robbie.​ ​We​ ​program​ ​"put​ ​book​ ​on table".​ ​This​ ​program​ ​causes​ ​Robbie​ ​to​ ​consult​ ​his​ ​map,​ ​find​ ​the​ ​book​ ​on​ ​the​ ​map​ ​with the​ ​minimal​ ​distance​ ​from​ ​R,​ ​activate​ ​sequences​ ​of​ ​motion​ ​closing​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​gap between​ ​R​ ​and​ ​the​ ​book,​ ​activate​ ​more​ ​sequences​ ​bringing​ ​various​ ​appendages​ ​into contact​ ​with​ ​the​ ​book,​ ​and​ ​then​ ​use​ ​those​ ​appendages​ ​to​ ​move​ ​the​ ​book​ ​to​ ​the​ ​table. We​ ​haven't​ ​given​ ​Robbie​ ​any​ ​​de​ ​se​ ​ ​states.​ ​He​ ​represents​ ​himself,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​as​ ​one​ ​object among​ ​many​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world.​ ​There's​ ​no​ ​sense​ ​in​ ​which​ ​he​ ​knows​ ​​which​ ​object​ ​he​ ​is​.​ ​But that's​ ​no​ ​barrier​ ​to​ ​Robbie's​ ​putting​ ​the​ ​book​ ​on​ ​the​ ​table. Robbie​ ​doesn't​ ​act​ ​yet,​ ​plausibly.​ ​He​ ​just​ ​does​ ​things​ ​on​ ​our​ ​command.​ ​To​ ​make​ ​Robbie more​ ​useful,​ ​we​ ​add​ ​a​ ​goal​ ​system​ ​to​ ​him.​ ​Now​ ​Robbie​ ​comes​ ​with​ ​a​ ​collection​ ​of​ ​target states​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​(maybe​ ​just​ ​represented​ ​as​ ​target​ ​objective​ ​maps).​ ​Robbie​ ​monitors the​ ​environment,​ ​creates​ ​and​ ​sustains​ ​an​ ​objective​ ​map,​ ​and​ ​when​ ​that​ ​objective​ ​map gets​ ​sufficiently​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​a​ ​target​ ​map​ ​(by​ ​some​ ​similarity​ ​score​ ​we​ ​program​ ​in),​ ​he initiates​ ​action​ ​that​ ​shifts​ ​the​ ​world​ ​into​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​the​ ​target​ ​map. 7 We​ ​still​ ​haven't​ ​given​ ​Robbie​ ​any​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​states,​ ​but​ ​it's​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​see​ ​why​ ​his​ ​behavioue doesn't​ ​count​ ​as​ ​full-fledged​ ​action​ ​on​ ​his​ ​part.​ ​If​ ​the​ ​fan​ ​of​ ​a​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​requirement​ ​thinks that​ ​Robbie​ ​isn't​ ​yet​ ​acting,​ ​then​ ​we​ ​think​ ​the​ ​burden​ ​is​ ​on​ ​them​ ​to​ ​say​ ​(in​ ​a non-question-begging​ ​way)​ ​what's​ ​missing.​ ​The​ ​important​ ​thing​ ​is​ ​that​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​danger that​ ​we'll​ ​find​ ​ourselves​ ​in​ ​the​ ​end​ ​with​ ​a​ ​robot​ ​that​ ​just​ ​doesn't​ ​do​ ​anything​ ​because​ ​we failed​ ​to​ ​include​ ​some​ ​special​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​into​ ​its​ ​representational​ ​systems. The​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​locate​ ​objects​ ​(either​ ​absolutely,​ ​or​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​one​ ​another)​ ​and​ ​to​ ​link invocation​ ​of​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​to​ ​object​ ​location,​ ​is​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​get​ ​action​ ​underway.​ ​There's no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​Robbie​ ​to​ ​have​ ​an​ ​additional​ ​special​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​​he​ ​himself​,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​distinctively first-personal​ ​way,​ ​is​ ​somewhere​ ​or​ ​other. Is​ ​there​ ​a​ ​worry​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have,​ ​without​ ​realizing​ ​it,​ ​given​ ​Robbie​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs?​ ​It's hard​ ​to​ ​see​ ​how,​ ​unless​ ​we​ ​just​ ​take​ ​"first-personal​ ​beliefs"​ ​to​ ​be​ ​​whatever​ ​sorts​ ​of beliefs​ ​suffice​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​about​ ​action​.​ ​(Of​ ​course​ ​we​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​(IIC)​ ​if​ ​"first-personal beliefs"​ ​is​ ​read​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​because​ ​this​ ​makes​ ​(IIC)​ ​into​ ​an​ ​uninteresting​ ​definitional tautology.)​ ​Robbie​ ​doesn't​ ​really​ ​even​ ​need​ ​to​ ​track​ ​Robbie's​ ​location.​ ​It​ ​would​ ​suffice, for​ ​example,​ ​to​ ​track​ ​the​ ​locations​ ​of​ ​Robbie's​ ​various​ ​appendages.​ ​(Depending​ ​on Robbie's​ ​design,​ ​those​ ​appendages​ ​could​ ​be​ ​in​ ​locations​ ​quite​ ​different​ ​from​ ​that​ ​of Robbie​ ​himself.)​ ​And​ ​for​ ​some​ ​cases,​ ​there​ ​won't​ ​even​ ​be​ ​a​ ​need​ ​to​ ​track​ ​the​ ​locations of​ ​the​ ​appendages.​ ​If,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​appendages​ ​are​ ​fixed​ ​in​ ​location,​ ​then Robbie​ ​can​ ​just​ ​track​ ​the​ ​locations​ ​of​ ​distal​ ​objects,​ ​and​ ​trigger​ ​action​ ​when​ ​those objects​ ​end​ ​up​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​locations.​ ​(Those​ ​locations​ ​will​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​coincide​ ​with​ ​the locations​ ​of​ ​Robbie's​ ​appendages,​ ​but​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​Robbie​ ​to​ ​know​ ​or​ ​otherwise represent​ ​that.​ ​We,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​programmers,​ ​just​ ​help​ ​ourselves​ ​to​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​stability​ ​in​ ​the world​ ​to​ ​simplify​ ​the​ ​programming​ ​task.) 6.​ ​Robots,​ ​gods,​ ​and​ ​corporate​ ​executives​ ​can​ ​all​ ​act.​ ​So​ ​can​ ​​entire​ ​corporations​.​ ​Apple performs​ ​actions​ ​all​ ​the​ ​time.​ ​Apple​ ​adds​ ​an​ ​edge-to-edge​ ​display​ ​to​ ​the​ ​new​ ​iphone. And​ ​it​ ​does​ ​this​ ​for​ ​a​ ​reason,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​characteristic​ ​way​ ​that​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​done.​ ​Apple​ ​​wants to​ ​win​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​share​ ​of​ ​the​ ​smartphone​ ​market​,​ ​and​ ​Apple​ ​​believes​ ​that​ ​an edge-to-edge​ ​display​ ​will​ ​help​ ​win​ ​customers​ ​away​ ​from​ ​Samsung​ ​phones​.​ ​That​ ​desire and​ ​that​ ​belief​ ​combine​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​about​ ​Apple's​ ​action. But​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​Apple​ ​to​ ​have​ ​any​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs.​ ​Indeed,​ ​Apple​ ​may​ ​be incapable​ ​of​ ​having​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs.​ ​What​ ​a​ ​corporation​ ​believes​ ​depends​ ​in​ ​part on​ ​institutional​ ​facts​ ​about​ ​the​ ​corporation.​ ​Apple​ ​knows​ ​Samsung's​ ​earnings​ ​for​ ​the year​ ​because​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​corporate-implemented​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​that​ ​fact​ ​--​ ​a​ ​file​ ​in​ ​a filing​ ​cabinet​ ​or​ ​on​ ​a​ ​computer​ ​with​ ​the​ ​earnings,​ ​or​ ​an​ ​corporate​ ​employee​ ​tasked​ ​with tracking​ ​Samsung​ ​earnings​ ​who​ ​knows​ ​the​ ​figure.​ ​If​ ​that​ ​same​ ​employee​ ​also​ ​knows IBM's​ ​earnings,​ ​but​ ​that​ ​knowledge​ ​isn't​ ​part​ ​of​ ​his​ ​corporate​ ​responsibility,​ ​that​ ​won't count​ ​as​ ​​Apple​​ ​knowing​ ​IBM's​ ​earnings.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​corporate​ ​beliefs​ ​can​ ​be​ ​haphazard and​ ​gappy​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​normal​ ​human​ ​beliefs​ ​typically​ ​are​ ​not.​ ​(Evans'​ ​Generality Principle,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​has​ ​little​ ​plausibility​ ​for​ ​​corporate​​ ​beliefs.)​ ​And​ ​since​ ​they​ ​can​ ​be 8 haphazard​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​it's​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​set​ ​up​ ​a​ ​corporation​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​just​ ​makes​ ​it impossible​ ​for​ ​it​ ​to​ ​have​ ​beliefs​ ​about​ ​​itself​ ​as​ ​itself​. And​ ​capable​ ​or​ ​not,​ ​Apple​ ​doesn't​ ​​need​​ ​those​ ​beliefs.​ ​Apple,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​doesn't​ ​need to​ ​track​ ​where​ ​it​ ​is,​ ​and​ ​where​ ​it​ ​is​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​targets​ ​of​ ​its​ ​action.​ ​It's​ ​not​ ​clear​ ​that Apple​ ​is​ ​anywhere​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​and​ ​even​ ​if​ ​it​ ​is​ ​somewhere​ ​(maybe​ ​in​ ​Cupertino,​ ​at corporate​ ​headquarters),​ ​where​ ​it​ ​is​ ​is​ ​irrelevant​ ​to​ ​how​ ​it​ ​acts.​ ​(Position​ ​relative​ ​to Cupertino​ ​doesn't​ ​need​ ​to​ ​be​ ​tracked​ ​to​ ​get​ ​edge-to-edge​ ​glass​ ​on​ ​the​ ​next​ ​iphone.) Similarly,​ ​Apple​ ​doesn't​ ​need​ ​to​ ​do​ ​any​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​its​ ​own​ ​capacities.​ ​Rather,​ ​its corporate​ ​architecture​ ​just​ ​builds​ ​its​ ​action​ ​structure​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​it​ ​just​ ​doesn't​ ​try​ ​to​ ​do the​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​things​ ​that​ ​it's​ ​incapable​ ​of​ ​doing,​ ​and​ ​does​ ​try​ ​to​ ​do​ ​the​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​things​ ​it​ ​is capable​ ​of​ ​doing.​ ​Apple​ ​can​ ​make​ ​an​ ​iphone​ ​with​ ​edge-to-edge​ ​glass,​ ​and​ ​it's​ ​got structural​ ​features​ ​that​ ​set​ ​it​ ​up​ ​to​ ​use​ ​that​ ​capacity.​ ​Apple​ ​can't​ ​win​ ​the​ ​100​ ​meter​ ​dash in​ ​the​ ​Olympics,​ ​but​ ​Apple​ ​is​ ​also​ ​set​ ​up​ ​in​ ​such​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​none​ ​of​ ​its​ ​beliefs​ ​and desires​ ​could​ ​even​ ​try​ ​to​ ​trigger​ ​such​ ​an​ ​action. Stepping​ ​back​ ​from​ ​the​ ​details:​ ​we​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​​possible​ ​ways​ ​acting​ ​beings​ ​could​ ​be organized​​ ​that​ ​let​ ​them​ ​act​ ​without​ ​having​ ​any​ ​first-personal​ ​mental​ ​states​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​the production​ ​of​ ​the​ ​action.​ ​There's​ ​​some​ ​sense​​ ​in​ ​which​ ​we​ ​think​ ​this​ ​is​ ​trivial.​ ​If​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​just events​ ​causally​ ​brought​ ​about​ ​by​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires,​ ​and​ ​if​ ​the​ ​causal​ ​effects​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​and desires​ ​​could​ ​be​​ ​pretty​ ​much​ ​anything,​ ​then​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​way​ ​any​ ​particular​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​belief​ ​is needed​ ​for​ ​action.​ ​(Forget​ ​the​ ​fancy​ ​stories​ ​told​ ​above​ ​--​ ​suppose​ ​we​ ​just​ ​posit​ ​a​ ​being​ ​in​ ​which the​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​two​ ​and​ ​two​ ​make​ ​four​ ​and​ ​the​ ​desire​ ​to​ ​eat​ ​a​ ​sandwich​ ​reliably​ ​cause​ ​a scratching​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nose.​ ​Then​ ​there's​ ​an​ ​action​ ​without​ ​any​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs.)​ ​But​ ​we​ ​don't want​ ​to​ ​lean​ ​too​ ​heavily​ ​on​ ​this​ ​way​ ​of​ ​putting​ ​things,​ ​because​ ​many​ ​people​ ​will​ ​deny​ ​the antecedent,​ ​and​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​such​ ​mere​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​need​ ​not​ ​be​ ​actions --​ ​that​ ​actions​ ​need​ ​to​ ​be​ ​caused​ ​​in​ ​the​ ​right​ ​way​​ ​by​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires. Absent​ ​the​ ​trivial​ ​argument,​ ​we​ ​need​ ​another​ ​way​ ​to​ ​convince​ ​people​ ​of​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​claim​ ​that contradicts​ ​(IIC).​ ​Part​ ​of​ ​that​ ​way​ ​involves​ ​defusing​ ​arguments​ ​in​ ​favor​ ​of​ ​the​ ​(IIC)​ ​--​ ​we'll​ ​come to​ ​that​ ​later​ ​in​ ​the​ ​paper.​ ​But​ ​another​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​way​ ​is​ ​vividly​ ​to​ ​display​ ​certain​ ​possibilities,​ ​to remind​ ​ourselves​ ​that​ ​the​ ​way​ ​action​ ​​typically​ ​occurs​ ​in​ ​us​​ ​isn't​ ​the​ ​only​ ​way​ ​that​ ​action​ ​could occur.​ ​The​ ​Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model​ ​was​ ​one​ ​attempt​ ​at​ ​such​ ​a​ ​vivid​ ​display,​ ​but​ ​it's​ ​not​ ​the​ ​only one.​ ​We​ ​think​ ​there​ ​are​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​that​ ​acting​ ​beings​ ​could​ ​be​ ​organized​ ​that​ ​let​ ​them​ ​be​ ​like enough​ ​to​ ​us​ ​in​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​ways​ ​for​ ​them​ ​to​ ​count​ ​as​ ​​really​ ​acting​,​ ​but​ ​that​ ​don't​ ​require​ ​them to​ ​use​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires.​ ​No​ ​single​ ​one​ ​of​ ​these​ ​cases​ ​is​ ​argumentatively essential.​ ​We're​ ​not​ ​saying​ ​of​ ​any​ ​of​ ​these​ ​pictures​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​how​ ​​action​ ​itself​ ​essentially works​,​ ​or​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​how​ ​we​ ​really​ ​act.​ ​We​ ​just​ ​want​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​some​ ​actions​ ​could​ ​be​ ​like​ ​this, and​ ​if​ ​​any​​ ​of​ ​those​ ​claims​ ​is​ ​right,​ ​then​ ​(IIC)​ ​fails. That​ ​said,​ ​we​ ​are​ ​inclined​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​many​ ​of​ ​our​ ​normal​ ​human​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​much​ ​like the​ ​actions​ ​described​ ​above.​ ​We​ ​are,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​our​ ​own​ ​little​ ​demigods.​ ​Gods​ ​of​ ​very​ ​limited scope​ ​(local​ ​deities​ ​of​ ​fingers​ ​and​ ​toes),​ ​but​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​certain​ ​basic​ ​muscular​ ​motions, 9 there​ ​is​ ​for​ ​us​ ​no​ ​gap​ ​between​ ​intention​ ​and​ ​action.​ ​To​ ​twitch​ ​a​ ​finger,​ ​you​ ​don't​ ​have​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a plan​ ​for​ ​the​ ​twitching,​ ​or​ ​track​ ​where​ ​the​ ​finger​ ​is.​ ​You​ ​just​ ​​directly​ ​twitch​.​ ​And​ ​we​ ​are​ ​CEOs​ ​of our​ ​own​ ​bodies,​ ​equipped​ ​with​ ​a​ ​host​ ​of​ ​executive​ ​assistants​ ​in​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​subpersonal computational​ ​systems​ ​that​ ​work​ ​out​ ​the​ ​details​ ​of​ ​how​ ​(some​ ​of)​ ​our​ ​schemes​ ​are​ ​to​ ​be​ ​put​ ​into biochemical​ ​action.​ ​Consider​ ​two​ ​ideas​ ​that​ ​underlie​ ​both​ ​the​ ​Action​ ​Inventory​ ​Model​ ​and​ ​a number​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cases​ ​discussed​ ​above: 1. Not​ ​every​ ​action​ ​comes​ ​with​ ​a​ ​plan​ ​for​ ​its​ ​implementation,​ ​or​ ​is​ ​done​ ​by​ ​performing​ ​other actions.​ ​Some​ ​actions​ ​do.​ ​Jones​ ​writes​ ​the​ ​email​ ​​by​ ​​turning​ ​on​ ​the​ ​computer,​ ​selecting words,​ ​and​ ​pressing​ ​keys​ ​on​ ​the​ ​keyboard.​ ​Pressing​ ​a​ ​key​ ​on​ ​the​ ​keyboard,​ ​in​ ​turn,​ ​is perhaps​ ​done​ ​​by​​ ​moving​ ​the​ ​finger​ ​in​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​way.​ ​But​ ​moving​ ​the​ ​finger​ ​in​ ​that​ ​way​ ​(to pick​ ​a​ ​stopping​ ​point)​ ​is​ ​not​ ​done​ ​by​ ​doing​ ​anything​ ​else.​ ​It's​ ​just​ ​a​ ​basic​ ​action;​ ​one​ ​that we​ ​can​ ​simply​ ​perform​ ​at​ ​will.​ ​(That's​ ​not​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​we​ ​are​ ​infallible​ ​in​ ​the​ ​performance of​ ​basic​ ​actions.​ ​It's​ ​just​ ​that​ ​when​ ​we​ ​fail​ ​at​ ​performing​ ​a​ ​basic​ ​action,​ ​it's​ ​a​ ​primitive failure,​ ​not​ ​a​ ​failure​ ​constituted​ ​by​ ​a​ ​failure​ ​to​ ​do​ ​something​ ​else.)​ ​Basic​ ​actions,​ ​being basic,​ ​don't​ ​require​ ​guidance​ ​by​ ​further​ ​mental​ ​states.​ ​Once​ ​we​ ​know​ ​the​ ​intentional content​ ​of​ ​the​ ​basic​ ​action,​ ​we​ ​know​ ​all​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​tools​ ​needed​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​that basic​ ​action.​ ​So​ ​if​ ​​moving​ ​a​ ​finger​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​basic​ ​action,​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​thoughts​ ​about specific​ ​muscles​ ​of​ ​the​ ​finger​​ ​in​ ​performing​ ​that​ ​action. What's​ ​characteristic​ ​about​ ​many​ ​of​ ​our​ ​cases​ ​above,​ ​then,​ ​is​ ​that​ ​they​ ​involve​ ​beings whose​ ​range​ ​of​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​involves​ ​actions​ ​with​ ​no​ ​first-personal​ ​component.​ ​In​ ​the limiting​ ​case,​ ​gods​ ​are​ ​beings​ ​for​ ​whom​ ​​every​​ ​action​ ​is​ ​basic.​ ​It's​ ​common​ ​to​ ​think​ ​of first-personal​ ​cases​ ​when​ ​thinking​ ​of​ ​ordinary​ ​human​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​(​move​ ​my​ ​finger, close​ ​my​ ​eyes​),​ ​but​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​clear​ ​reason​ ​why​ ​actions​ ​that​ ​aren't​ ​first-personal​ ​(and everyone​ ​agrees​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​such​ ​actions,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​they​ ​think​ ​that​ ​performing​ ​those actions​ ​requires​ ​other​ ​first-personal​ ​states)​ ​can't​ ​also​ ​be​ ​basic. 2.​ ​Relatedly,​ ​it's​ ​a​ ​mistake​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​because​ ​successful​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​an​ ​action involves​ ​being​ ​rightly​ ​related​ ​to​ ​some​ ​object​ ​or​ ​concept,​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have​ ​to​ ​​mentally represent​​ ​that​ ​object​ ​or​ ​concept.​ ​This​ ​mistake​ ​is​ ​what​ ​we​ ​called​ ​the​ ​​Overrepresentation Fallacy​​ ​in​ ​​Inessential​ ​Indexical​.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​for​ ​a​ ​baseball​ ​player​ ​to​ ​catch​ ​a​ ​fly​ ​ball,​ ​he must​ ​run​ ​at​ ​a​ ​speed​ ​and​ ​in​ ​a​ ​direction​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​first​ ​derivative​ ​of​ ​the​ ​tangent​ ​of​ ​the apparent​ ​angle​ ​of​ ​elevation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ball​ ​is​ ​constant.​ ​But​ ​of​ ​course​ ​it​ ​doesn't​ ​follow​ ​from that​ ​that​ ​baseball​ ​players​ ​need​ ​to​ ​have​ ​​beliefs​​ ​about​ ​first​ ​derivatives​ ​of​ ​tangents.​ ​Not even​ ​tacit​ ​beliefs​ ​of​ ​this​ ​sort​ ​are​ ​needed,​ ​and​ ​not​ ​even​ ​mental​ ​representations​ ​in subpersonal​ ​systems.​ ​It​ ​suffices​ ​if​ ​something​ ​in​ ​the​ ​full​ ​physical​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​the agent,​ ​connecting​ ​mental​ ​states​ ​to​ ​bodily​ ​movement,​ ​encodes​ ​an​ ​appropriate​ ​sensitivity to​ ​the​ ​derivative.​ ​(This​ ​could,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​by​ ​having​ ​the​ ​visual​ ​system​ ​set up​ ​so​ ​that​ ​it​ ​creates​ ​visual​ ​seemings​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​properly​ ​correlated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​relevant derivative.) For​ ​creatures​ ​whose​ ​causal​ ​powers​ ​have​ ​any​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​locality​ ​constraint,​ ​where​ ​they​ ​are in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​targets​ ​of​ ​their​ ​action​ ​will​ ​matter​ ​to​ ​how​ ​the​ ​action​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​performed. 10 But​ ​it​ ​would​ ​again​ ​be​ ​a​ ​fallacy​ ​of​ ​overrepresentation​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​such​ ​creatures​ ​thus had​ ​to​ ​​mentally​ ​represent​​ ​where​ ​they​ ​are​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​their​ ​targets.​ ​Jeeve​ ​Stobs​ ​doesn't need​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​track​ ​of​ ​where​ ​things​ ​are,​ ​because​ ​he​ ​has​ ​assistants​ ​that​ ​do​ ​the​ ​tracking for​ ​him.​ ​That​ ​fact​ ​is​ ​key​ ​to​ ​Stobs'​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​act​ ​without​ ​first-personal​ ​beliefs. When​ ​we​ ​set​ ​aside​ ​the​ ​modal​ ​claim​ ​of​ ​(IIC)​ ​and​ ​consider​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​how​ ​we​ ​in​ ​the​ ​actual world​ ​really​ ​act,​ ​our​ ​(admittedly​ ​armchair)​ ​suspicion​ ​is​ ​twofold.​ ​First,​ ​our​ ​basic​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​pretty expansive​ ​(and​ ​able​ ​to​ ​expand​ ​with​ ​experience​ ​and​ ​expertise),​ ​and​ ​that​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​we​ ​often​ ​act directly​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​our​ ​body.​ ​(When​ ​the​ ​car​ ​skids,​ ​we​ ​perform​ ​a​ ​basic​ ​action​ ​of righting​ ​the​ ​car's​ ​course.​ ​Even​ ​​turning​ ​the​ ​steering​ ​wheel​,​ ​much​ ​less​ ​​tensing​ ​our​ ​arms​,​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a subaction​ ​of​ ​that​ ​action.)​ ​Second,​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​lot​ ​less​ ​representation​ ​going​ ​on​ ​than​ ​one​ ​might initially​ ​suspect.​ ​We​ ​routinely​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​contingent​ ​regularities​ ​of​ ​our​ ​environment​ ​and​ ​of​ ​our capacities​ ​to​ ​save​ ​attentional​ ​energy​ ​by​ ​not​ ​representing​ ​things​ ​that​ ​aren't​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​change​ ​or matter.​ ​Given​ ​those​ ​two​ ​pieces,​ ​we​ ​suspect​ ​that​ ​a​ ​lot​ ​of​ ​our​ ​ordinary​ ​action​ ​is​ ​indeed​ ​impersonal in​ ​our​ ​sense. Replies​ ​to​ ​Torre,​ ​Ninan,​ ​and​ ​Bermúdez We​ ​turn​ ​now​ ​to​ ​3​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​defend​ ​IIC.​ ​​ ​The​ ​defenses​ ​we​ ​consider​ ​are​ ​from​ ​Dilip​ ​Ninan,​ ​Stephan Torre,​ ​and​ ​​José​ ​Luis​ ​Bermúdez​. Reply​ ​to​ ​Stephan​ ​Torre Stefan​ ​Torre​ ​in​ ​"In​ ​Defense​ ​of​ ​​De​ ​Se​​ ​Content"​ ​(Torre​ ​2017)​ ​argues​ ​for​ ​a​ ​principle​ ​he​ ​calls (CDDS): (CDDS)​ ​Necessarily,​ ​for​ ​any​ ​subjects,​ ​S​ ​and​ ​T,​ ​if​ ​S​ ​and​ ​T​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​the content​ ​of​ ​their​ ​beliefs,​ ​then​ ​they​ ​have​ ​the​ ​same​ ​​de​ ​se​ ​​beliefs. We​ ​won't​ ​be​ ​concerned​ ​here​ ​specifically​ ​with​ ​objecting​ ​to​ ​(CDDS).​ ​Torre​ ​wants​ ​to​ ​work​ ​with​ ​a notion​ ​of​ ​"​de​ ​se​​ ​belief"​ ​that​ ​is​ ​broad​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​skeptics​ ​like​ ​us​ ​to​ ​agree​ ​that​ ​there are​ ​such​ ​beliefs​ ​(roughly,​ ​beliefs​ ​that​ ​subjects​ ​are​ ​disposed​ ​to​ ​report​ ​using​ ​first-person pronouns).​ ​But​ ​in​ ​arguing​ ​for​ ​(CDDS),​ ​Torre​ ​relies​ ​on​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​action​ ​that​ ​conflicts​ ​with​ ​things we​ ​say​ ​in​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical​ ​​,​ ​and​ ​which​ ​we​ ​think​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​an​ ​objectionable​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​the de​ ​se​,​ ​so​ ​we​ ​do​ ​want​ ​to​ ​show​ ​why​ ​we​ ​disagree​ ​with​ ​that​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​action. Torre's​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​(CDDS)​ ​is​ ​the​ ​following: My​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​CDDS​ ​can​ ​be​ ​summarized​ ​as​ ​follows:​ ​(1)​ ​Suppose​ ​we​ ​have​ ​two subjects​ ​with​ ​different​ ​​de​ ​se​ ​​beliefs.​ ​(2)​ ​Then​ ​they​ ​will​ ​act​ ​differently​ ​or​ ​be​ ​disposed​ ​to act​ ​differently.​ ​(3)​ ​Appeal​ ​to​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​content​ ​is​ ​essential​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​in action​ ​or​ ​disposition​ ​to​ ​act​ ​differently.​ ​(4)​ ​Therefore​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​content 11 between​ ​the​ ​two​ ​subjects.​ ​So​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​​de​ ​se​ ​​belief​ ​entails​ ​a​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​content. (Torre​ ​2017:3) It's​ ​step​ ​(3)​ ​in​ ​this​ ​argument​ ​that​ ​particularly​ ​concerns​ ​us.​ ​Note​ ​that​ ​step​ ​(3)​ ​doesn't​ ​itself​ ​make mention​ ​of​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​belief​ ​(in​ ​Torre's​ ​"neutral"​ ​sense),​ ​so​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​need​ ​to​ ​engage​ ​with​ ​that​ ​idea​ ​to discuss​ ​what​ ​worries​ ​us​ ​here. Step​ ​(3)​ ​concerns​ ​us​ ​because,​ ​of​ ​course,​ ​it's​ ​the​ ​thought​ ​that​ ​underlies​ ​one​ ​standard​ ​way​ ​of responding​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Perry​ ​cases.​ ​Consider​ ​Torre's​ ​version​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Perry​ ​case: Let​ ​us​ ​consider​ ​a​ ​case​ ​in​ ​which​ ​David's​ ​pants​ ​catch​ ​fire​ ​and​ ​Susan,​ ​who​ ​is​ ​standing nearby,​ ​sees​ ​it​ ​happen.​ ​Suppose​ ​David​ ​forms​ ​a​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​he​ ​expresses​ ​by​ ​saying​ ​"My pants​ ​are​ ​on​ ​fire"​ ​and​ ​Susan,​ ​upon​ ​observing​ ​David​ ​and​ ​hearing​ ​his​ ​utterance,​ ​forms​ ​a belief​ ​that​ ​she​ ​expresses​ ​by​ ​saying​ ​"Your​ ​pants​ ​are​ ​on​ ​fire".​ ​...​ ​​ ​David​ ​will​ ​stop,​ ​drop,​ ​and roll,​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​will​ ​run​ ​to​ ​get​ ​the​ ​fire​ ​extinguisher.​ ​What​ ​explains​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​in action?​ ​(Torre​ ​2017:3) The​ ​strategy​ ​in​ ​such​ ​cases,​ ​from​ ​our​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view,​ ​is​ ​to​ ​stipulate​ ​cases​ ​in​ ​which​ ​(i)​ ​two​ ​agents perform​ ​different​ ​actions,​ ​but​ ​(ii)​ ​​when​ ​we​ ​restrict​ ​ourselves​ ​to​ ​non-de-se​ ​contents​​ ​(here​ ​not​ ​in Torre's​ ​neutral​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​"​de​ ​se​ ​ ​belief",​ ​but​ ​in​ ​the​ ​theoretically​ ​laden​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​distinctively​ ​​de​ ​se contents),​ ​the​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​have​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires.​ ​If​ ​we​ ​add​ ​to​ ​such​ ​cases​ ​Torre's step​ ​(3),​ ​we're​ ​then​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​stick​ ​in​ ​some​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​action. Before​ ​getting​ ​into​ ​the​ ​central​ ​issues​ ​concerning​ ​step​ ​(3),​ ​let's​ ​consider​ ​a​ ​somewhat​ ​subtle dialectical​ ​issue.​ ​Suppose​ ​we​ ​just​ ​conceded​ ​this​ ​point​ ​and​ ​endorsed​ ​Torre's​ ​(3).​ ​Then​ ​we'd​ ​be forced​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​content​ ​between​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan,​ ​and​ ​so (presumably)​ ​at​ ​least​ ​one​ ​of​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​is​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​their​ ​action appeals​ ​to​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents.​ ​But​ ​notice​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​still​ ​far​ ​from​ ​an​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​(IIC).​ ​(IIC)​ ​is​ ​a necessitated​ ​universal​ ​claim:​ ​it​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​​every​ ​possible​ ​action​​ ​has​ ​some​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents​ ​in​ ​its explanation.​ ​All​ ​we​ ​have​ ​here​ ​is​ ​​one​ ​particular​ ​action​​ ​that​ ​has​ ​a​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​content​ ​in​ ​its​ ​explanation; it's​ ​fully​ ​compatible​ ​with​ ​that​ ​that​ ​other​ ​actions​ ​(maybe​ ​even​ ​one​ ​of​ ​David's​ ​and​ ​Susan's actions)​ ​don't​ ​have​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents​ ​in​ ​their​ ​explanation.​ ​And​ ​thus​ ​it's​ ​compatible​ ​with​ ​this​ ​case that​ ​(IIC)​ ​is​ ​false. Maybe​​ ​we​ ​could​ ​try​ ​to​ ​generalize​ ​this​ ​reasoning​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​full​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​(IIC).​ ​Presumably the​ ​strategy​ ​would​ ​be​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​for​ ​every​ ​action,​ ​it's​ ​possible​ ​that​ ​there​ ​be​ ​a​ ​Perry​ ​case involving​ ​that​ ​action,​ ​in​ ​which​ ​another​ ​agent​ ​has​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​non-​de-se​​ ​contents​ ​but​ ​doesn't perform​ ​that​ ​action.​ ​There's​ ​a​ ​worry​ ​that​ ​there's​ ​quite​ ​an​ ​extrapolation​ ​here​ ​from​ ​some​ ​specific cases,​ ​but​ ​we​ ​also​ ​think​ ​that​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​extrapolation​ ​were​ ​fine,​ ​it​ ​still​ ​wouldn't​ ​be​ ​enough​ ​--​ ​all we​ ​would​ ​get​ ​from​ ​the​ ​extrapolation​ ​is​ ​that​ ​​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two​​ ​actions​ ​in​ ​the​ ​paired​ ​cases​ ​involved de​ ​se​ ​​contents,​ ​which​ ​isn't​ ​enough​ ​for​ ​(IIC).​ ​That​ ​said,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​we​ ​can​ ​hold​ ​on​ ​to​ ​the​ ​rejection​ ​of (IIC),​ ​there's​ ​still​ ​more​ ​concession​ ​to​ ​the​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​even​ ​in​ ​the​ ​single​ ​case​ ​than​ ​we'd​ ​like​ ​to​ ​make. 12 We'd​ ​prefer​ ​a​ ​view​ ​on​ ​which​ ​there​ ​was​ ​​never​​ ​a​ ​need​ ​to​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​special​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents​ ​in explaining​ ​action. As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​we​ ​want​ ​to​ ​reject​ ​step​ ​(3).​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​we​ ​reject​ ​the​ ​principle: (DADC)​ ​If​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​perform​ ​different​ ​actions,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​some​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​(non-​de-se​) attitude​ ​content​ ​between​ ​them. But​ ​if​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​attitude​ ​content​ ​doesn't​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​action​ ​between​ ​David​ ​and Susan,​ ​what​ ​does?​ ​As​ ​Torre​ ​notes,​ ​in​ ​​II​ ​ ​we​ ​suggested​ ​that​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​could​ ​be​ ​explained​ ​by a​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​what​ ​they​ ​were​ ​​able​ ​to​ ​do​.​ ​If​ ​David​ ​can​ ​perform​ ​​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops,​ ​and​ ​rolls​,​ ​but Susan​ ​cannot,​ ​then​ ​of​ ​course​ ​it's​ ​no​ ​surprise​ ​when​ ​David​ ​​does​​ ​perform​ ​that​ ​action​ ​and​ ​Susan doesn't. Torre​ ​then​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​this​ ​proposal​ ​isn't​ ​adequate​ ​to​ ​all​ ​cases.​ ​He​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​we​ ​can​ ​remove​ ​the difference​ ​in​ ​ability​ ​between​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​without​ ​disturbing​ ​the​ ​crucial​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​the case: The​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​available​ ​action​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​action performed​ ​is​ ​unsuccessful.​ ​This​ ​can​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​by​ ​considering​ ​a​ ​scenario​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the same​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​available​ ​to​ ​both​ ​subjects.​ ​Suppose​ ​that,​ ​​unbeknownst​​ ​to​ ​her,​ ​Susan has​ ​magical​ ​powers​ ​and​ ​is​ ​able​ ​to​ ​cast​ ​a​ ​spell​ ​that​ ​will​ ​result​ ​in​ ​the​ ​action​ ​that​ ​David stops,​ ​drops​ ​and​ ​rolls.​ ​Or​ ​perhaps,​ ​​unbeknownst​​ ​to​ ​her,​ ​her​ ​neurons​ ​are​ ​connected (perhaps​ ​wirelessly)​ ​to​ ​David's​ ​motor​ ​cortex​ ​so​ ​that​ ​she​ ​is​ ​able​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action​ ​that David​ ​stops,​ ​drops​ ​and​ ​rolls.​ ​Having​ ​the​ ​same​ ​impersonal​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​as​ ​David, Susan's​ ​belief-desire-obligation-intention​ ​set​ ​produces​ ​the​ ​same​ ​input​ ​action​ ​as​ ​David's belief-desire-obligation​ ​set:​ ​that​ ​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops​ ​and​ ​rolls.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​this​ ​action matches​ ​one​ ​of​ ​Susan's​ ​available​ ​actions:​ ​that​ ​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops​ ​and​ ​rolls.​ ​But​ ​Susan does​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​this​ ​action.​ ​The​ ​action​ ​switchboard​ ​appears​ ​to​ ​have​ ​malfunctioned. (Torre​ ​2017:5,​ ​our​ ​emphasis) We​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​Torre​ ​that​ ​such​ ​cases​ ​are​ ​possible.​ ​People​ ​can​ ​fail​ ​to​ ​act​ ​on​ ​abilities​ ​that​ ​they have,​ ​even​ ​when​ ​they​ ​have​ ​every​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​act​ ​on​ ​them.​ ​So​ ​we​ ​agree​ ​that​ ​some​ ​further explanation​ ​is​ ​called​ ​for​ ​here.​ ​(Although​ ​we'll​ ​suggest​ ​below​ ​that​ ​we​ ​should​ ​be​ ​open​ ​to​ ​the thought​ ​that​ ​there's​ ​only​ ​a​ ​rather​ ​thin​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​explanation​ ​available​ ​in​ ​some​ ​cases.) We​ ​then​ ​want​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a​ ​two-fold​ ​response​ ​to​ ​Torre's​ ​"hidden​ ​ability"​ ​cases.​ ​First,​ ​it's​ ​also possible​ ​to​ ​construct​ ​such​ ​cases​ ​when​ ​there​ ​is​ ​sameness​ ​of​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​beliefs​ ​as​ ​well.​ ​There​ ​are cases​ ​in​ ​which​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​have​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​attitudes​ ​​both​ ​objective​ ​and​ ​de​ ​se​,​ ​and​ ​all​ ​the same​ ​abilities,​ ​but​ ​nevertheless​ ​perform​ ​different​ ​actions.​ ​Presumably​ ​Torre's​ ​thought​ ​is​ ​that while​ ​(DADC)​ ​is​ ​false,​ ​(DADC*)​ ​is​ ​true: 13 (DADC*)​ ​If​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​perform​ ​different​ ​actions,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​some​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​attitude content​ ​(broadly​ ​construed​ ​to​ ​include​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​objective​ ​contents)​ ​between​ ​them. If​ ​(DADC*)​ ​isn't​ ​true,​ ​then​ ​it's​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​see​ ​why​ ​we​ ​would​ ​accept​ ​Torre's​ ​step​ ​(3).​ ​But​ ​(DADC*)​ ​is incompatible​ ​with​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sort​ ​we'll​ ​go​ ​on​ ​to​ ​suggest.​ ​That​ ​much​ ​alone​ ​is​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​show that​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​consideration​ ​in​ ​favor​ ​of​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents​ ​coming​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Perry​ ​cases.​ ​If​ ​there's a​ ​puzzle​ ​here,​ ​it's​ ​a​ ​​general​ ​puzzle​.​ ​It's​ ​the​ ​observation​ ​that​ ​sometimes,​ ​despite​ ​everything anyone​ ​wanted​ ​to​ ​cite​ ​by​ ​way​ ​of​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​action,​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​can​ ​have​ ​all​ ​of​ ​those​ ​things​ ​in common​ ​yet​ ​act​ ​differently.​ ​That​ ​would​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​gap​ ​in​ ​our​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​action.​ ​But​ ​that gap​ ​would​ ​also​ ​be​ ​a​ ​gap​ ​in​ ​the​ ​​de​ ​se​ ​​friendly​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​action,​ ​so​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that the​ ​mysterious​ ​​something​​ ​that​ ​fills​ ​the​ ​gap​ ​has​ ​anything​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​the​ ​​de​ ​se​.​ ​But​ ​second,​ ​we think​ ​that​ ​we​ ​can​ ​make​ ​at​ ​least​ ​some​ ​steps​ ​toward​ ​solving​ ​the​ ​general​ ​puzzle.​ ​We'll​ ​thus​ ​end the​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​Torre​ ​by​ ​gesturing​ ​at​ ​what​ ​we​ ​think​ ​​does​​ ​differentiate​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan. Torre's​ ​problem​ ​for​ ​us,​ ​again,​ ​is​ ​that​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​can​ ​have​ ​an​ ​ability​ ​and​ ​have​ ​every​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​act on​ ​that​ ​ability,​ ​yet​ ​still​ ​fail​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​to​ ​act​ ​on​ ​it.​ ​Why​ ​wouldn't​ ​Susan​ ​perform​ ​​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops, and​ ​rolls​​ ​when​ ​she​ ​can,​ ​and​ ​when​ ​she​ ​has​ ​reason​ ​to?​ ​A​ ​natural​ ​thought​ ​is​ ​that​ ​she​ ​doesn't know/believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​can.​ ​That​ ​natural​ ​thought​ ​suggests​ ​a​ ​general​ ​principle: (Control)​ ​For​ ​agent​ ​A​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​action​ ​F,​ ​A​ ​must​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​​can​​ ​F. ​ ​Susan​ ​then​ ​doesn't​ ​perform​ ​​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops,​ ​and​ ​rolls​​ ​because​ ​she​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​she can​ ​perform​ ​that​ ​action. But​ ​once​ ​(Control)​ ​is​ ​explicitly​ ​formulated,​ ​it's​ ​not​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​see​ ​that​ ​it​ ​can't​ ​be​ ​right.​ ​There​ ​are straightforward​ ​cases​ ​in​ ​which​ ​agents​ ​perform​ ​actions​ ​that​ ​they​ ​don't​ ​think​ ​they​ ​are​ ​capable​ ​of. (Such​ ​is​ ​the​ ​stuff​ ​that​ ​heroes​ ​are​ ​made​ ​of.)​ ​Suppose​ ​that​ ​Susan​ ​is​ ​in​ ​the​ ​middle​ ​of​ ​running​ ​an ultramarathon.​ ​She​ ​is​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​completing​ ​the​ ​race,​ ​but​ ​she​ ​doesn't​ ​think​ ​that​ ​she​ ​is​ ​capable of​ ​it.​ ​She​ ​feels​ ​exhausted,​ ​and​ ​her​ ​assessment​ ​is​ ​that​ ​she​ ​can't​ ​make​ ​it​ ​to​ ​the​ ​end.​ ​(Note​ ​thus that​ ​she​ ​can​ ​not​ ​only​ ​​fail​ ​to​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​can​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action​,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​positively​ ​​believe that​ ​she​ ​cannot​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action​.)​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​she​ ​keeps​ ​running,And​ ​does​ ​indeed​ ​finish. There​ ​is,​ ​we​ ​think,​ ​nothing​ ​unusual​ ​about​ ​such​ ​a​ ​case. Two​ ​concerns​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​raised​ ​about​ ​the​ ​case: 1. Surely​ ​at​ ​some​ ​level​ ​Susan​ ​believed​ ​that​ ​she​ ​could​ ​complete​ ​the​ ​race?​ ​We​ ​don't​ ​see why​ ​we​ ​should​ ​accept​ ​that.​ ​We​ ​want​ ​to​ ​stipulate​ ​a​ ​case​ ​in​ ​which​ ​Susan​ ​is​ ​thoroughly pessimistic.​ ​She​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​at​ ​any​ ​level​ ​that​ ​she​ ​can​ ​complete​ ​the​ ​race.​ ​(Try running​ ​an​ ​ultramarathon​ ​if​ ​you're​ ​skeptical​ ​that​ ​participants​ ​reach​ ​such​ ​levels​ ​of pessimism.)​ ​Maybe​ ​you​ ​think​ ​that​ ​such​ ​cases​ ​aren't​ ​even​ ​possible,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​burden​ ​is then​ ​on​ ​you​ ​to​ ​justify​ ​that​ ​impossibility​ ​claim.​ ​(And​ ​of​ ​course​ ​an​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​(DADC*)​ ​in arguing​ ​for​ ​the​ ​impossibility​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​would​ ​be​ ​question-begging​ ​in​ ​context.​ ​We​ ​could have​ ​made​ ​the​ ​same​ ​move​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​Torre's​ ​David-and-Susan​ ​variant.)​ ​Minor 14 variants​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​will​ ​show​ ​that​ ​Susan​ ​also​ ​need​ ​not​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​​might​ ​be​ ​able​​ ​to complete​ ​the​ ​race,​ ​or​ ​that​ ​​she​ ​is​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​trying​ ​​to​ ​complete​ ​the​ ​race.​ ​None​ ​of​ ​these beliefs​ ​are​ ​needed​ ​for​ ​her​ ​to​ ​act. 2. The​ ​thought​ ​that​ ​Susan​ ​surely​ ​must​ ​at​ ​some​ ​level​ ​believe​ ​she​ ​could​ ​complete​ ​the​ ​race springs,​ ​we​ ​think,​ ​from​ ​the​ ​further​ ​concern​ ​that​ ​if​ ​she​ ​didn't​ ​believe​ ​that,​ ​there's​ ​nothing that​ ​would​ ​explain​ ​her​ ​continuing​ ​to​ ​run.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​think​ ​that's​ ​wrong.​ ​There's​ ​a​ ​perfectly good​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​her​ ​continued​ ​running.​ ​She​ ​wants​ ​to​ ​finish​ ​the​ ​race,​ ​and​ ​running​ ​is the​ ​way​ ​to​ ​finish​ ​the​ ​race.​ ​Why​ ​wouldn't​ ​this​ ​explain​ ​her​ ​running? In​ ​addition​ ​to​ ​such​ ​an​ ​ordinary​ ​case,​ ​we​ ​think​ ​there's​ ​also​ ​a​ ​recipe​ ​for​ ​constructing​ ​​extraordinary cases​ ​in​ ​which​ ​agents​ ​act​ ​without​ ​the​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are​ ​able​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action.​ ​The​ ​recipe picks​ ​up​ ​on​ ​tactics​ ​that​ ​Williamson​ ​uses​ ​in​ ​objecting​ ​to​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​epistemic​ ​analyticity.​ ​We imagine​ ​agents​ ​with​ ​strange​ ​theoretical​ ​commitments​ ​that​ ​undermine​ ​certain​ ​ordinary​ ​beliefs. Thus​ ​consider: Quinean​ ​Susan​:​ ​Quinean​ ​Susan​ ​has​ ​read​ ​too​ ​much​ ​Quine​ ​and​ ​become​ ​a​ ​modal skeptic.​ ​She​ ​think​ ​that​ ​modal​ ​expressions​ ​in​ ​English​ ​don't​ ​express​ ​any​ ​real​ ​concepts, and​ ​she​ ​thus​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​any​ ​claims​ ​involving​ ​modals.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​she​ ​doesn't believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​​is​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​finishing​ ​the​ ​​ ​race​,​ ​because​ ​that​ ​is​ ​a​ ​modal​ ​claim. McTaggartian​ ​Susan​:​ ​McTaggartian​ ​Susan​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​no​ ​events.​ ​(Maybe because​ ​events​ ​are​ ​temporally​ ​extended,​ ​and​ ​she​ ​has​ ​become​ ​committed​ ​to​ ​the unreality​ ​of​ ​time.)​ ​Unfortunately,​ ​she's​ ​also​ ​a​ ​Davidsonian​ ​on​ ​the​ ​semantics​ ​of​ ​action verbs,​ ​so​ ​she​ ​thinks​ ​"running"​ ​claims​ ​involve​ ​existential​ ​quantification​ ​over​ ​running events.​ ​Since​ ​she​ ​thinks​ ​there​ ​are​ ​no​ ​such​ ​events,​ ​she​ ​thinks​ ​no​ ​one​ ​ever​ ​runs.​ ​As​ ​a result,​ ​she​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​is​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​finishing​ ​the​ ​race,​ ​because​ ​that​ ​claim involves​ ​quantification​ ​over​ ​events. But​ ​both​ ​Quinean​ ​Susan​ ​and​ ​McTaggartian​ ​Susan​ ​are​ ​runners.​ ​They​ ​were​ ​both​ ​experienced runners​ ​before​ ​undergoing​ ​their​ ​philosophical​ ​conversion,​ ​and​ ​they​ ​carried​ ​on​ ​their​ ​​activity post-conversion​ ​(although​ ​McTaggartian​ ​Susan​ ​would​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​describe​ ​that​ ​activity​ ​in​ ​the same​ ​way).​ ​Both​ ​are​ ​thus​ ​examples​ ​of​ ​people​ ​who​ ​do​ ​things​ ​they​ ​don't​ ​think​ ​they​ ​can​ ​do. (Control),​ ​then,​ ​is​ ​false.​ ​And​ ​from​ ​counterexamples​ ​to​ ​(Control),​ ​it's​ ​easy​ ​to​ ​build counterexamples​ ​to​ ​(DADC*)​ ​--​ ​cases​ ​in​ ​which​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​have​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​abilities,​ ​and​ ​all​ ​of the​ ​same​ ​attitudes,​ ​objective​ ​and​ ​​de​ ​se​,​ ​but​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​nevertheless​ ​act​ ​differently. All​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to​ ​do​ ​is​ ​add​ ​to​ ​Torre's​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​case​ ​the​ ​further​ ​stipulation​ ​that​ ​David,​ ​like Susan,​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​he​ ​can​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action​ ​​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops,​ ​and​ ​rolls.​​ ​With​ ​that addition,​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​are​ ​perfect​ ​psychological​ ​matches​ ​both​ ​objectively​ ​and​ ​in​ ​​de​ ​se terms.​ ​But​ ​nevertheless,​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​act​ ​differently.​ ​David​ ​stops,​ ​drops,​ ​and​ ​rolls,​ ​while Susan​ ​calls​ ​for​ ​help. 15 If​ ​you​ ​don't​ ​accept​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​our​ ​case​ ​(but​ ​do​ ​accept​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​Torre's​ ​original case),​ ​we​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​that's​ ​because​ ​you're​ ​still​ ​in​ ​the​ ​grips​ ​of​ ​(Control).​ ​Once​ ​we​ ​remind ourselves​ ​that​ ​people​ ​sometimes​ ​do​ ​what​ ​they​ ​don't​ ​believe​ ​they​ ​can​ ​do,​ ​we​ ​should​ ​see​ ​that David​ ​could​ ​be​ ​one​ ​of​ ​those​ ​people.​ ​And​ ​if​ ​he​ ​is,​ ​then​ ​our​ ​case​ ​is​ ​possible,​ ​and​ ​it counterexamples​ ​(DADC*),​ ​refuting​ ​step​ ​(3)​ ​and​ ​undermining​ ​the​ ​positive​ ​case​ ​for​ ​​de​ ​se contents. One​ ​final​ ​point.​ ​We​ ​think​ ​we've​ ​said​ ​what​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​said​ ​to​ ​respond​ ​to​ ​Torre's​ ​challenge​ ​to our​ ​view​ ​at​ ​this​ ​point.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​agree​ ​that​ ​a​ ​mystery​ ​still​ ​remains.​ ​In​ ​our​ ​modified David-and-Susan​ ​case,​ ​David​ ​acts​ ​on​ ​an​ ​ability​ ​he​ ​has​ ​but​ ​doesn't​ ​think​ ​he​ ​has,​ ​while​ ​Susan doesn't​ ​act​ ​on​ ​an​ ​ability​ ​she​ ​has​ ​but​ ​doesn't​ ​think​ ​she​ ​has.​ ​That's​ ​a​ ​difference​ ​between​ ​David and​ ​Susan,​ ​and​ ​one​ ​that​ ​we​ ​haven't​ ​offered​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​for.​ ​All​ ​we've​ ​done​ ​is​ ​argued​ ​that Torre​ ​​also​​ ​doesn't​ ​have​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​it,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​that​ ​these​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​differences​ ​don't​ ​give us​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​posit​ ​special​ ​difference-explaining​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents. But​ ​we​ ​also​ ​suspect​ ​that​ ​lingering​ ​mysteries​ ​are​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​things​ ​that​ ​push​ ​people​ ​to​ ​get interested​ ​in​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​if​ ​the​ ​mystery​ ​lingers,​ ​people​ ​will​ ​just​ ​convince​ ​themselves that​ ​there's​ ​some​ ​​other​​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​difference​ ​between​ ​David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​that​ ​we've​ ​missed.​ ​(We're not​ ​sure​ ​why​ ​people​ ​find​ ​acceptable​ ​to​ ​​stipulate​​ ​a​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​objective​ ​difference​ ​between​ ​David and​ ​Susan,​ ​but​ ​still​ ​allow​ ​themselves​ ​to​ ​​discover​​ ​a​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​difference.​ ​We're​ ​a​ ​bit​ ​suspicious​ ​that it's​ ​because​ ​the​ ​​de​ ​se​​ ​contents​ ​are​ ​just​ ​a​ ​magical​ ​black​ ​box,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​since​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​know​ ​what they​ ​really​ ​are,​ ​people​ ​don't​ ​take​ ​seriously​ ​stipulations​ ​about​ ​them.)​ ​So​ ​we​ ​want​ ​to​ ​offer​ ​some brief​ ​gestures​ ​toward​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​why​ ​people​ ​sometimes​ ​do​ ​and​ ​sometimes​ ​don't​ ​use abilities​ ​they​ ​have,​ ​when​ ​they​ ​have​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​use​ ​them. David​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​both​ ​enter​ ​a​ ​race.​ ​Both​ ​are​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​both​ ​running​ ​the​ ​race​ ​and​ ​skipping through​ ​the​ ​race.​ ​But​ ​neither​ ​thinks​ ​(in​ ​the​ ​manner​ ​we've​ ​discussed​ ​above)​ ​that​ ​they​ ​have​ ​either of​ ​these​ ​abilities.​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​David​ ​runs​ ​the​ ​race,​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​skips​ ​along​ ​the​ ​race.​ ​Why, then,​ ​does​ ​David​ ​run​ ​and​ ​Susan​ ​skip? Roughly,​ ​we​ ​want​ ​to​ ​say:​ ​because​ ​those​ ​are​ ​their​ ​habits.​ ​David​ ​is​ ​a​ ​habitual​ ​runner,​ ​so​ ​in situations​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​dealt​ ​with​ ​by​ ​running,​ ​his​ ​habit​ ​is​ ​to​ ​run.​ ​He's​ ​developed​ ​a​ ​disposition​ ​to deploy​ ​that​ ​ability,​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​his​ ​beliefs​ ​about​ ​the​ ​ability.​ ​Susan​ ​is​ ​a​ ​habitual​ ​skipper,​ ​so​ ​in situations​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​dealt​ ​with​ ​by​ ​skipping,​ ​her​ ​habit​ ​is​ ​to​ ​skip.​ ​She's​ ​developed​ ​a​ ​disposition to​ ​deploy​ ​​that​​ ​ability,​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​her​ ​beliefs​ ​about​ ​the​ ​ability. We​ ​enter​ ​this​ ​world​ ​with​ ​a​ ​collection​ ​of​ ​abilities,​ ​but​ ​with​ ​no​ ​information​ ​about​ ​what​ ​abilities​ ​we have.​ ​Early​ ​in​ ​life,​ ​we​ ​stumble​ ​on​ ​to​ ​some​ ​of​ ​those​ ​abilities​ ​during​ ​the​ ​general​ ​flailing-about​ ​of infancy.​ ​The​ ​reward​ ​mechanism​ ​of​ ​that​ ​stumbling-on​ ​produces​ ​in​ ​us​ ​a​ ​disposition​ ​to​ ​try​ ​more things​ ​of​ ​that​ ​sort​ ​(a​ ​disposition​ ​that,​ ​again,​ ​need​ ​not​ ​be​ ​reflected​ ​in​ ​a​ ​​belief).​ ​​Two​ ​people​ ​can both​ ​wiggle​ ​their​ ​ears.​ ​One​ ​does​ ​and​ ​the​ ​other​ ​doesn't,​ ​at​ ​the​ ​crucial​ ​time​ ​--​ ​that's​ ​because​ ​one is​ ​a​ ​wiggler​ ​in​ ​general,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​disposed​ ​to​ ​try​ ​wiggling​ ​solutions,​ ​while​ ​the​ ​other​ ​isn't.​ ​If​ ​Susan has​ ​magical​ ​abilities​ ​to​ ​control​ ​David's​ ​action,​ ​she​ ​presumably​ ​doesn't​ ​use​ ​them​ ​because​ ​she's 16 not​ ​in​ ​the​ ​practice​ ​of​ ​exercising​ ​magical​ ​abilities,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​it​ ​never​ ​occurs​ ​to​ ​her​ ​to​ ​act​ ​in​ ​that way.​ ​(Note​ ​that​ ​Susan's​ ​failure​ ​to​ ​act​ ​becomes​ ​more​ ​puzzling​ ​if​ ​we​ ​build​ ​into​ ​the​ ​case​ ​that​ ​she's a​ ​practicing​ ​magician.) Note​ ​the​ ​similarity​ ​here​ ​to​ ​our​ ​earlier​ ​case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CEO​ ​and​ ​his​ ​assistants.​ ​There​ ​could​ ​be​ ​two executives​ ​E1​ ​and​ ​E2​ ​with​ ​two​ ​assistants​ ​A1​ ​and​ ​A2.​ ​E1​ ​and​ ​E2​ ​both​ ​order​ ​their​ ​assistants​ ​"win the​ ​race!".​ ​But​ ​A1​ ​can​ ​make​ ​E1​ ​run,​ ​but​ ​not​ ​skip,​ ​so​ ​A1​ ​starts​ ​E1​ ​running​ ​down​ ​the​ ​course.​ ​A2, on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​can​ ​make​ ​E2​ ​skip,​ ​but​ ​not​ ​run,​ ​so​ ​A2​ ​starts​ ​E2​ ​skipping​ ​down​ ​the​ ​course. The​ ​result​ ​is​ ​that​ ​E1​ ​and​ ​E2​ ​act​ ​differently,​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​reflects​ ​their​ ​different​ ​abilities​ ​to​ ​act, without​ ​ever​ ​knowing​ ​about​ ​what​ ​they​ ​can​ ​and​ ​can't​ ​do.​ ​They​ ​act​ ​differently​ ​because​ ​they​ ​have different​ ​assistants​ ​--​ ​that​ ​is,​ ​different​ ​non-attitudinal​ ​mechanisms​ ​for​ ​implementing​ ​their​ ​goals. Reply​ ​to​ ​Dilip​ ​Ninan We​ ​turn​ ​now​ ​to​ ​Dilip​ ​Ninan's​ ​objection​ ​in​ ​his​ ​(....)​ ​paper.​ ​Ninan​ ​says: A​ ​notable​ ​feature​ ​of​ ​Cappelen​ ​and​ ​Dever's​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​the​ ​use​ ​of​ ​agent-specific​ ​action types​ ​such​ ​as​ ​'the​ ​action​ ​that​ ​DN​ ​curls​ ​up'.​ ​But​ ​do​ ​Cappelen​ ​and​ ​Dever​ ​also​ ​allow​ ​into their​ ​ontology​ ​agent-neutral​ ​actions,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​(much​ ​more​ ​familiar)​ ​action​ ​of​ ​curling up?​ ​Unlike​ ​the​ ​former,​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​is​ ​an​ ​action​ ​that​ ​agents​ ​other​ ​than​ ​me​ ​can​ ​perform. Cappelen​ ​and​ ​Dever​ ​certainly​ ​write​ ​in​ ​various​ ​places​ ​as​ ​if​ ​they​ ​do​ ​accept​ ​action​ ​types​ ​of this​ ​sort​ ​(e.g.​ ​Cappelen​ ​&​ ​Dever​ ​2013,​ ​47).​ ​And​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​good​ ​thing​ ​too,​ ​since​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​that no​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​can​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​same​ ​action​ ​is​ ​absurd.​ ​(Ninan​ ​2017:​ ​106) Ninan​ ​presents​ ​us​ ​with​ ​the​ ​following​ ​familiar​ ​scenario:​ ​​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​both​ ​think​ ​a​ ​bear​ ​is​ ​attacking​ ​A, but​ ​they​ ​act​ ​differently.​ ​A​ ​curls​ ​up​ ​in​ ​a​ ​ball,​ ​and​ ​B​ ​runs​ ​away.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​draft​ ​of​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​says: First​ ​draft​ ​of​ ​problem​:​ ​that's​ ​mysterious.​ ​Why​ ​do​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​perform​ ​different​ ​actions​ ​if​ ​they have​ ​the​ ​same​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires? Ninan​ ​then​ ​concedes​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have​ ​a​ ​response​ ​to​ ​this: Response​ ​to​ ​first​ ​draft​ ​of​ ​problem​:​ ​the​ ​action​ ​in​ ​question​ ​is​ ​"A​ ​curls​ ​up​ ​in​ ​a​ ​ball".​ ​Both​ ​A and​ ​B​ ​have​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​this,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​A​ ​can,​ ​so​ ​only​ ​A​ ​does. Ninan​ ​then​ ​has​ ​a​ ​second​ ​draft​ ​of​ ​the​ ​problem: Second​ ​draft​ ​of​ ​problem​:​ ​but​ ​what​ ​about​ ​another​ ​action:​ ​​curls​ ​up​ ​in​ ​a​ ​ball​.​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​can both​ ​perform​ ​this​ ​action,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​one​ ​does.​ ​Why? 17 First​ ​stab​ ​at​ ​an​ ​answer​:​ ​"curls​ ​up​ ​in​ ​a​ ​ball"​ ​is​ ​an​ ​action​ ​​type​,​ ​not​ ​an​ ​action.​ ​And​ ​we​ ​never​ ​said that​ ​if​ ​two​ ​people​ ​had​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​psychological​ ​states,​ ​they​ ​would​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​same​ ​action types.​ ​So​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​problem​ ​here. Second​ ​stab​ ​at​ ​an​ ​answer:​​ ​"A​ ​curls​ ​up​ ​in​ ​a​ ​ball"​ ​is​ ​an​ ​action​ ​type,​ ​too.​ ​It​ ​must​ ​be,​ ​if​ ​we're contemplating​ ​both​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​doing​ ​it.​ ​Two​ ​people​ ​can t​ ​both​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​very​ ​same​ ​token action.This​ ​shows​ ​that​ ​there's​ ​something​ ​wrong​ ​with​ ​Ninan's​ ​Explanation​ ​principle: Explanation​:​ ​​ ​Suppose​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​x​ ​performed​ ​action​ ​α​ ​is​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​x has​ ​beliefs​ ​B​x​​ ​​p1​​ ​,​ ​...,​ ​B​ x​​ ​​pn​​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​D​ x​​ ​​q1​​ ​,​ ​...,​ ​D​ x​​ ​​qn​​ ​.​ ​Then,​ ​if​ ​y​ ​has​ ​beliefs​ ​By​ ​B​ y​​ ​​p1​​ ​, ...,B​y​​ ​​p2​​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​D​ y​​ ​​q1​​ ​,​ ​...,​ ​D​ y​​ ​​qn​​ ​,​ ​then,​ ​other​ ​things​ ​being​ ​equal,​ ​y​ ​will​ ​also​ ​perform​ ​α. (Ninan​ ​2016:​ ​102) Put​ ​a​ ​bit​ ​loosely: If​ ​two​ ​agents​ ​have​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​(relevant)​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires,​ ​then,​ ​other​ ​things​ ​being equal,​ ​they​ ​will​ ​behave​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​way. Note​ ​that​ ​this​ ​must​ ​mean​ ​they​ ​will​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​same​ ​action​ ​​types​,​ ​since​ ​they​ ​have​ ​no​ ​chance​ ​of performing​ ​the​ ​same​ ​action​ ​tokens.​ ​Once​ ​we​ ​see​ ​this,​ ​we​ ​see​ ​that​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​attention​ ​to the​ ​way​ ​actions​ ​are​ ​typed.​ ​Consider​ ​the​ ​type​ ​"Action​ ​performed​ ​by​ ​A".​ ​It s​ ​definitely​ ​not​ ​true​ ​that if​ ​both​ ​of​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​have​ ​the​ ​same​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires,​ ​then​ ​A​ ​performs​ ​an​ ​action​ ​of​ ​the​ ​type "action​ ​performed​ ​by​ ​A"​ ​if​ ​and​ ​only​ ​if​ ​B​ ​performs​ ​an​ ​action​ ​of​ ​the​ ​type​ ​"action​ ​performed​ ​by​ ​A". That​ ​way​ ​of​ ​typing​ ​actions​ ​isn't​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​we​ ​expect​ ​to​ ​be​ ​captured​ ​by​ ​patterns​ ​of​ ​psychological attitudes.​ ​And​ ​there​ ​are​ ​lots​ ​of​ ​types​ ​like​ ​this,​ ​not​ ​all​ ​as​ ​trivial​ ​as​ ​the​ ​"action​ ​performed​ ​by​ ​A" type.​ ​Consider​ ​the​ ​type​ ​"dangerous​ ​action".​ ​If​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​have​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires, does​ ​it​ ​follow​ ​that​ ​A​ ​performs​ ​a​ ​dangerous​ ​action​ ​if​ ​and​ ​only​ ​if​ ​B​ ​performs​ ​a​ ​dangerous​ ​action? No.​ ​A​ ​might​ ​be​ ​courageous​ ​and​ ​B​ ​cowardly,​ ​so​ ​that​ ​A​ ​acts​ ​on​ ​the​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires,​ ​and​ ​B doesn t.​ ​Or​ ​A's​ ​situation​ ​might​ ​be​ ​dangerous​ ​and​ ​B s​ ​not.​ ​Again,​ ​belief​ ​desire​ ​psychology​ ​is​ ​the wrong​ ​place​ ​to​ ​look​ ​for​ ​explanations​ ​of​ ​that​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​action​ ​type​ ​similarity. So​ ​here's​ ​the​ ​general​ ​picture.​ ​There​ ​are​ ​many​ ​many​ ​potential​ ​token​ ​actions,​ ​and​ ​there​ ​are many​ ​many​ ​potential​ ​agents.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​there​ ​are: ● Many​ ​different​ ​relations​ ​between​ ​agents​ ​(​having​ ​the​ ​same​ ​psychological​ ​state,​ ​being​ ​in the​ ​same​ ​room​ ​as,​ ​being​ ​braver​ ​than,​ ​being​ ​identical​ ​to​). ● Many​ ​different​ ​ways​ ​of​ ​typing​ ​actions,​ ​where​ ​an​ ​action​ ​type​ ​can​ ​be​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​as​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of action​ ​tokens. Now​ ​pick​ ​some​ ​relation​ ​R​ ​between​ ​agents​ ​and​ ​some​ ​typing​ ​T​ ​of​ ​actions.​ ​We​ ​can​ ​then​ ​ask​ ​the following​ ​question: 18 (Typing​ ​Question)​ ​​Does​ ​relation​ ​R​ ​guarantee​ ​T-sameness​ ​in​ ​action?​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​is​ ​it​ ​true that​ ​if​ ​agent​ ​A​ ​stands​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​R​ ​to​ ​agent​ ​B,​ ​and​ ​A​ ​performs​ ​an​ ​action​ ​of​ ​type​ ​T,​ ​then​ ​B also​ ​performs​ ​an​ ​action​ ​of​ ​type​ ​T? The​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Typing​ ​Question​ ​will​ ​vary​ ​depending​ ​on​ ​both​ ​R​ ​and​ ​T.​ ​At​ ​one​ ​extreme,​ ​if​ ​R​ ​is the​ ​identity​ ​relation,​ ​then​ ​(trivially)​ ​the​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Typing​ ​Question​ ​is​ ​"yes"​ ​for​ ​any​ ​type​ ​T.​ ​But for​ ​any​ ​choice​ ​of​ ​R​ ​other​ ​than​ ​the​ ​identity​ ​relation,​ ​the​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Typing​ ​Question​ ​will sometimes​ ​be​ ​"no".​ ​(For​ ​example,​ ​when​ ​T​ ​is​ ​​action​ ​performed​ ​by​ ​A​.) When​ ​we're​ ​in​ ​the​ ​business​ ​of​ ​understanding​ ​action,​ ​then,​ ​one​ ​thing​ ​we​ ​might​ ​be​ ​doing is​ ​presenting​ ​various​ ​choices​ ​for​ ​R​ ​relations,​ ​and​ ​making​ ​correlation​ ​claims​ ​about​ ​what​ ​action types​ ​T​ ​get​ ​preserved​ ​by​ ​a​ ​given​ ​choice​ ​for​ ​R.​ ​​ ​Ninan​ ​endorses​ ​one​ ​very​ ​specific​ ​such correlation​ ​claim: ● When​ ​R​ ​is​ ​the​ ​relation​ ​of​ ​​having​ ​the​ ​same​ ​belief​ ​and​ ​desire​ ​contents​,​ ​then​ ​we​ ​get correlation​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​any​ ​type​ ​T​ ​of​ ​the​ ​form​ ​​is​ ​an​ ​action​ ​whose​ ​content​ ​is​ ​given​ ​by φ(a)​ ​for​ ​some​ ​object​ ​a​. So​ ​Ninan​ ​endorses​ ​a​ ​principle​ ​according​ ​to​ ​which,​ ​if​ ​A​ ​and​ ​B​ ​have​ ​all​ ​the​ ​same​ ​beliefs​ ​and desires,​ ​and​ ​A​ ​performs​ ​some​ ​action​ ​N,​ ​then​ ​B​ ​also​ ​performs​ ​an​ ​action​ ​whose​ ​content​ ​is​ ​the same​ ​as​ ​the​ ​content​ ​of​ ​N,​ ​but​ ​with​ ​mention​ ​of​ ​A​ ​in​ ​the​ ​content​ ​replaced​ ​by​ ​mention​ ​of​ ​B.​ ​If​ ​A performs​ ​​A​ ​runs​ ​away​,​ ​then​ ​B​ ​performs​ ​​B​ ​runs​ ​away​. We,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​correlation​ ​happens​ ​at​ ​a​ ​slightly​ ​different​ ​place.​ ​We endorse: ● When​ ​R​ ​is​ ​the​ ​relation​ ​of​ ​​having​ ​the​ ​same​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​and​ ​available​ ​actions​, then​ ​we​ ​get​ ​correlation​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​any​ ​type​ ​T​ ​of​ ​the​ ​form​ ​​is​ ​an​ ​action​ ​whose​ ​content is​ ​given​ ​by​ ​​φ. Since​ ​no​ ​one​ ​can​ ​get​ ​any​ ​​perfect​​ ​correlation​ ​principle,​ ​getting​ ​correlation​ ​for​ ​all​ ​types​ ​T​ ​(for​ ​any R​ ​relation​ ​short​ ​of​ ​identity),​ ​the​ ​question​ ​is​ ​just​ ​whether​ ​we​ ​are​ ​getting​ ​​enough​​ ​correlation. Enough​ ​for​ ​what?​ ​Presumably,​ ​enough​ ​for​ ​our​ ​ordinary​ ​concepts​ ​of​ ​belief​ ​and​ ​desire​ ​to​ ​play​ ​a reasonable​ ​role​ ​in​ ​predicting,​ ​explaining,​ ​rationalizing,​ ​and​ ​causing​ ​ordinary​ ​actions.​ ​We​ ​think we​ ​are.​ ​We're​ ​not​ ​claiming​ ​a​ ​correlation​ ​pattern​ ​that​ ​does​ ​​all​​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​explaining​ ​why​ ​people do​ ​what​ ​they​ ​do,​ ​but​ ​we've​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​no​ ​one​ ​can​ ​have​ ​such​ ​a​ ​pattern,​ ​so​ ​that's​ ​not​ ​the success​ ​condition.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​are​ ​claiming​ ​a​ ​correlation​ ​pattern​ ​that's​ ​robust​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​make​ ​sense of​ ​ordinary​ ​folk​ ​psychology,​ ​and​ ​as​ ​long​ ​as​ ​we​ ​have​ ​that,​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​take​ ​it​ ​as​ ​a​ ​serious​ ​objection that​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​get​ ​exactly​ ​Ninan's​ ​preferred​ ​correlation. 4 4 ​ ​​It's​ ​worth​ ​noting​ ​that​ ​we​ ​can​ ​get​ ​pretty​ ​much​ ​the​ ​pattern​ ​that​ ​Ninan​ ​wants.​ ​We​ ​agree​ ​that​ ​if​ ​we​ ​group​ ​agents​ ​not​ ​by sameness​ ​of​ ​belief​ ​desire​ ​content,​ ​but​ ​by​ ​sameness​ ​of​ ​belief​ ​desire​ ​content​ ​minus​ ​specification​ ​of​ ​agent,​ ​then​ ​we​ ​get prediction​ ​of​ ​action​ ​typed​ ​at​ ​a​ ​level​ ​of​ ​propositional​ ​content​ ​minus​ ​agent.​ ​This​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​seems​ ​like​ ​a​ ​natural​ ​pattern​ ​to 19 Reply​ ​to​ ​José​ ​Luis​ ​Bermúdez José​​ ​​Bermúdez​ ​in​ ​"Yes,​ ​indexicals​ ​really​ ​are​ ​essential"​ ​and​ ​in​ ​Chapter​ ​1​ ​of​ ​his​ ​book Understanding​ ​"I":​ ​​ ​Language​ ​and​ ​Thought​​ ​(Bermúdez​ ​2017)​ ​​responds​ ​in​ ​a​ ​three​ ​step​ ​argument: Premise​ ​1:​ ​​No​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​can​ ​correctly​ ​reconstruct​ ​an​ ​agent's​ ​practical reasoning​ ​if​ ​it​ ​is​ ​possible​ ​for​ ​some​ ​agent​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​every​ ​propositional​ ​attitude​ ​in​ ​the​ ​set and​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action. Premise​ ​2:​ ​​Even​ ​if​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​holds​ ​every​ ​propositional​ ​attitude​ ​in​ ​an​ ​impersonal​ ​action rationalization,​ ​she​ ​will​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​consequent​ ​action​ ​if​ ​she​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​she​ ​is​ ​not the​ ​person​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​in​ ​the​ ​action​ ​rationalization. Premise​ ​3:​ ​​For​ ​any​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​realization​ ​it​ ​is​ ​possible​ ​for​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​every propositional​ ​attitude​ ​in​ ​the​ ​set​ ​and​ ​nonetheless​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​she​ ​herself​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the person​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​in​ ​those​ ​attitudes. From​ ​these​ ​three​ ​premises,​ ​Bermúdez​ ​derives: (IICa):​ ​Impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalizations​ ​are​ ​necessarily​ ​incomplete. We​ ​reject​ ​(IICa),​ ​and​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​it.​ ​We​ ​give​ ​two​ ​replies​ ​to​ ​the​ ​argument.​ ​​ ​In​ ​our first​ ​reply,​ ​we​ ​observe​ ​that​ ​premise​ ​2​ ​begs​ ​the​ ​question​ ​against​ ​an​ ​important​ ​element​ ​of​ ​our view.​ ​In​ ​our​ ​second​ ​reply,​ ​we​ ​observe​ ​that​ ​Premise​ ​1​ ​unnecessarily​ ​excludes​ ​all​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus action​ ​rationalizations.​ ​We​ ​show​ ​that​ ​a​ ​consequence​ ​of​ ​this​ ​exclusion​ ​would​ ​be​ ​the​ ​essentiality not​ ​just​ ​of​ ​indexical​ ​beliefs​ ​but​ ​of​ ​all​ ​beliefs,​ ​and​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​this​ ​observation​ ​conclude​ ​that we​ ​should​ ​allow​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus​​ ​rationalizations. We​ ​also​ ​have​ ​a​ ​third​ ​point​ ​of​ ​disagreement​ ​with​ ​Bermúdez.​ ​He​ ​takes​ ​(IICa)​ ​to​ ​be​ ​insufficient​ ​to establish​ ​genuine​ ​essential​ ​indexicality​ ​--​ ​he​ ​wants​ ​to​ ​show​ ​that​ ​impersonal​ ​action rationalizations​ ​are​ ​incomplete​ ​​because​​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​cite​ ​indexical​ ​attitudes.​ ​He​ ​thus​ ​argues​ ​that action​ ​rationalizations​ ​that​ ​are​ ​neutral​ ​on​ ​indexical​ ​matters,​ ​requiring​ ​neither​ ​that​ ​the​ ​acting agent​ ​has​ ​nor​ ​that​ ​the​ ​acting​ ​agent​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​such​ ​attitudes,​ ​are​ ​incomplete.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​third reply,​ ​we​ ​also​ ​reject​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​further​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​neutrality​ ​on​ ​indexical​ ​matters​ ​creates​ ​a problem​ ​for​ ​completeness​ ​of​ ​action​ ​rationalizations,​ ​observing​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​straightforward cases​ ​in​ ​which​ ​neutrality​ ​is​ ​unproblematic. First​ ​Reply:​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument​ ​assumes​ ​incorrectly​ ​that​ ​all​ ​impersonal​ ​action rationalization​ ​is​ ​subject-referring. expect,​ ​better​ ​than​ ​the​ ​patterning​ ​Ninan​ ​looks​ ​for.​ ​And​ ​we​ ​think​ ​it​ ​will​ ​let​ ​us​ ​do​ ​anything​ ​more​ ​in​ ​the​ ​way​ ​of psychological​ ​explanation​ ​that​ ​Ninan​ ​might​ ​still​ ​have​ ​wanted​ ​after​ ​our​ ​first​ ​proposition​ ​level​ ​typing​ ​principle. 20 In​ ​the​ ​book​ ​we​ ​introduce​ ​what​ ​we​ ​call​ ​​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalizations​.​ ​Those​ ​come​ ​in​ ​two kinds​ ​and​ ​these​ ​are​ ​our​ ​illustrations: Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​1. •​ ​Belief:​ ​François​ ​is​ ​about​ ​to​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Desire:​ ​François​ ​not​ ​be​ ​shot. •​ ​Belief:​ ​If​ ​François​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table,​ ​he​ ​will​ ​not​ ​be​ ​shot. ​ ​•​ ​Action:​ ​François​ ​ducks​ ​under​ ​the​ ​table. Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​2. •​ ​Belief:​ ​Nora​ ​is​ ​in​ ​danger. •​ ​Desire:​ ​Nora​ ​not​ ​be​ ​hurt. •​ ​Belief:​ ​If​ ​the​ ​door​ ​is​ ​closed,​ ​Nora​ ​will​ ​be​ ​safe. •​ ​Action:​ ​Herman​ ​closes​ ​the​ ​door. Throughout​ ​the​ ​book,​ ​we​ ​point​ ​out​ ​an​ ​important​ ​feature​ ​of​ ​​Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​2​: the​ ​propositional​ ​attitudes​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​in​ ​the​ ​rationalization​ ​​don't​ ​mention​ ​or​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​agent, i.e.​ ​to​ ​Herman​.​ ​We​ ​say:​ ​"Note​ ​that​ ​in​ ​this​ ​case​ ​the​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​doesn't attribute​ ​"Herman"-beliefs​ ​or​ ​"Herman"-desires​ ​to​ ​Herman.​ ​Instead,​ ​the​ ​rationalization​ ​is​ ​entirely third-person."​ ​(37)​ ​​ ​Our​ ​picture​ ​was​ ​this:​ ​When​ ​Herman​ ​sees​ ​his​ ​daughter​ ​in​ ​danger,​ ​he​ ​just acts.​ ​Not​ ​via​ ​some​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​himself​ ​-​ ​he​ ​doesn't,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​need​ ​to​ ​go​ ​via​ ​the​ ​belief that​ ​Nora​ ​is​ ​Herman's​ ​daughter.​ ​He​ ​just​ ​acts​ ​when​ ​Nora​ ​is​ ​in​ ​danger. With​ ​that​ ​in​ ​mind,​ ​consider​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​Premise​ ​2.​ ​In​ ​saying​ ​"she​ ​will​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the consequent​ ​action​ ​if​ ​she​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​she​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​person​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​in​ ​the​ ​action rationalization,"​ ​this​ ​premise​ ​simply​ ​presupposes​ ​that​ ​all​ ​action​ ​rationalisations​ ​are​ ​of​ ​the subject-referring​ ​kind​ ​and​ ​that​ ​none​ ​are​ ​of​ ​our​ ​second​ ​kind.​ ​Bermúdez​ ​gives​ ​no​ ​argument​ ​for that​ ​assumption. 5 In​ ​sum:​ ​If​ ​you​ ​take​ ​into​ ​account​ ​the​ ​non-subject​ ​referring​ ​cases​ ​that​ ​we​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​throughout​ ​the book,​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument​ ​is​ ​unsound​ ​because​ ​premise​ ​2​ ​is​ ​false​ ​(as​ ​is​ ​assumption​ ​3,​ ​as noted​ ​in​ ​footnote​ ​4).​ ​We​ ​are​ ​of​ ​course​ ​open​ ​to​ ​arguments​ ​to​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​that​ ​we​ ​shouldn't​ ​have included​ ​such​ ​cases,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​focus​ ​of​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​paper​ ​isn't​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​that,​ ​it​ ​simply assumes​ ​it.​ ​Moreover,​ ​several​ ​of​ ​the​ ​models​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​part​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​share​ ​that​ ​feature​ ​with Impersonal​ ​Action​ ​Rationalization​ ​2:​ ​the​ ​gods,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​when​ ​they​ ​act​ ​simply​ ​by​ ​intending that​ ​the​ ​world​ ​be​ ​so-and-so,​ ​need​ ​no​ ​mention​ ​of​ ​themselves​ ​in​ ​the​ ​explanations​ ​of​ ​their​ ​actions. 5​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​Assumption​ ​3​ ​also​ ​presupposes​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​no​ ​non-subject​ ​referring​ ​rationalisations: Assumption​ ​3​:​ ​An​ ​impersonal​ ​propositional​ ​attitude​ ​is​ ​one​ ​that​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​the​ ​agent​ ​non-indexically​ ​–​ ​e.g. through​ ​a​ ​proper​ ​name​ ​or​ ​non-indexical​ ​definite​ ​description. 21 Second​ ​Reply:​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument​ ​assumes​ ​incorrectly​ ​that​ ​all​ ​practical​ ​reasoning​ ​is not​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus​. Our​ ​first​ ​reply​ ​shows​ ​that​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument​ ​has​ ​no​ ​force​ ​against​ ​non-subject-referring action​ ​rationalizations.​ ​In​ ​our​ ​second​ ​reply,​ ​we​ ​show​ ​that​ ​it​ ​also​ ​fails​ ​even​ ​when​ ​its​ ​scope​ ​is restricted​ ​to​ ​subject-referring​ ​action​ ​rationalizations.​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​Premise​ ​1​ ​places​ ​a​ ​very​ ​strong necessity​ ​requirement​ ​on​ ​such​ ​action​ ​rationalizations.​ ​For​ ​a​ ​set​ ​S​ ​of​ ​propositional​ ​attitudes​ ​to reconstruct​ ​an​ ​agent's​ ​practical​ ​reasoning,​ ​it​ ​must​ ​be​ ​​impossible​​ ​for​ ​any​ ​agent​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​all​ ​of those​ ​attitudes​ ​and​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action. But​ ​as​ ​stated,​ ​this​ ​principle​ ​is​ ​clearly​ ​false.​ ​Suppose​ ​Alex​ ​wants​ ​a​ ​drink​ ​of​ ​water​ ​and​ ​believes there​ ​is​ ​water​ ​in​ ​the​ ​glass,​ ​and​ ​she​ ​then​ ​picks​ ​up​ ​the​ ​glass.​ ​​Prima​ ​facie​,​ ​we'd​ ​like​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​her desire​ ​and​ ​belief​ ​explain​ ​her​ ​action.​ ​But​ ​it's​ ​​possible​​ ​for​ ​Alex​ ​to​ ​be​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​the​ ​chair,​ ​or​ ​to​ ​be paralyzed,​ ​or​ ​to​ ​be​ ​given​ ​drugs​ ​that​ ​interfere​ ​with​ ​her​ ​practical​ ​reasoning.​ ​In​ ​any​ ​of​ ​these​ ​cases, she​ ​would​ ​​not​​ ​pick​ ​up​ ​the​ ​glass.​ ​These​ ​possibilities,​ ​however,​ ​do​ ​not​ ​prevent​ ​her​ ​desire​ ​and belief​ ​from​ ​rationalizing​ ​her​ ​actual​ ​(unimpaired)​ ​action. Action​ ​rationalizations,​ ​like​ ​most​ ​explanations,​ ​are​ ​typically​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus​.​ ​They​ ​take​ ​place against​ ​a​ ​background​ ​of​ ​normal​ ​conditions,​ ​and​ ​they​ ​don't​ ​bring​ ​about​ ​the​ ​explanandum​ ​when conditions​ ​are​ ​sufficiently​ ​abnormal.​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​Premise​ ​1​ ​disallows​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus explanations,​ ​because​ ​it​ ​requires​ ​that​ ​there​ ​be​ ​no​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​having​ ​the​ ​explanans​ ​without getting​ ​the​ ​explanandum​ ​as​ ​well,​ ​no​ ​matter​ ​how​ ​abnormal​ ​the​ ​situation.​ ​Premise​ ​1​ ​should​ ​thus be​ ​rejected.​ ​Without​ ​Premise​ ​1,​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument​ ​collapses,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​(contrary​ ​to​ ​our remarks​ ​above)​ ​Premise​ ​2​ ​is​ ​accepted. Suppose​ ​we​ ​rewrite​ ​Premise​ ​1​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus​​ ​explanations: Premise​ ​1*:​ ​No​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​can​ ​correctly​ ​reconstruct​ ​an​ ​agent's​ ​practical reasoning​ ​if​ ​there​ ​are​ ​normal​ ​conditions​ ​in​ ​which​ ​some​ ​agent​ ​holds​ ​every​ ​propositional attitude​ ​in​ ​the​ ​set​ ​and​ ​doesn't​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action. For​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​reasoning​ ​to​ ​go​ ​through,​ ​Premise​ ​3​ ​would​ ​need​ ​to​ ​be​ ​revised​ ​to​ ​guarantee​ ​that the​ ​addition​ ​of​ ​identity-confusion​ ​beliefs​ ​fell​ ​under​ ​normal​ ​conditions: Premise​ ​3*:​ ​For​ ​any​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​there​ ​are​ ​normal​ ​conditions​ ​in which​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​holds​ ​every​ ​propositional​ ​attitude​ ​in​ ​the​ ​set​ ​and​ ​nonetheless​ ​believes that​ ​she​ ​herself​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​person​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​in​ ​those​ ​attitudes. But​ ​we​ ​see​ ​no​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​accept​ ​Premise​ ​3*.​ ​Our​ ​grip​ ​on​ ​'normal​ ​conditions'​ ​is​ ​through​ ​our understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​agents​ ​we​ ​are​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​explain,​ ​so​ ​to​ ​convince​ ​us​ ​that​ ​adding identity-confusion​ ​beliefs​ ​always​ ​preserves​ ​normality,​ ​you​ ​have​ ​to​ ​convince​ ​us​ ​that​ ​our explanatory​ ​practice​ ​isn't​ ​sometimes​ ​​designed​​ ​for​ ​non-identity-confused​ ​agents. 22 To​ ​see​ ​what's​ ​going​ ​on​ ​more​ ​clearly,​ ​remember​ ​that​ ​identity-confusion​ ​beliefs​ ​are​ ​not​ ​the​ ​only beliefs​ ​that​ ​will​ ​be​ ​covered​ ​by​ ​​ceteris​ ​paribus​​ ​clauses.​ ​Alex​ ​desires​ ​water,​ ​and​ ​she​ ​believes​ ​that there​ ​is​ ​water​ ​in​ ​the​ ​glass.​ ​But​ ​if​ ​she​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​everyone​ ​on​ ​earth​ ​will​ ​be​ ​tortured​ ​if​ ​she​ ​picks up​ ​the​ ​glass,​ ​she​ ​will​ ​not​ ​pick​ ​up​ ​the​ ​glass.​ ​We​ ​would​ ​be​ ​inclined​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​a​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​global torture​ ​results​ ​from​ ​lifting​ ​a​ ​glass​ ​is​ ​an​ ​​abnormal​ ​ ​belief,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​gets​ ​swept​ ​up​ ​into​ ​the​ ​​ceteris paribus​​ ​clause.​ ​Consider​ ​an​ ​analogue​ ​of​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​argument.​ ​Call​ ​an​ ​action​ ​rationalization atortural​ ​if​ ​it​ ​says​ ​nothing​ ​about​ ​whether​ ​torture​ ​results​ ​from​ ​lifting​ ​glasses.​ ​Then: Premise​ ​1*:​ ​No​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​can​ ​correctly​ ​reconstruct​ ​an​ ​agent's​ ​practical reasoning​ ​if​ ​there​ ​are​ ​normal​ ​conditions​ ​in​ ​which​ ​some​ ​agent​ ​holds​ ​every​ ​propositional attitude​ ​in​ ​the​ ​set​ ​and​ ​does​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action. Modified​ ​Premise​ ​2:​ ​Even​ ​if​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​holds​ ​every​ ​propositional​ ​attitude​ ​in​ ​an​ ​atortural action​ ​rationalization,​ ​she​ ​will​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action​ ​if​ ​she​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​global​ ​torture​ ​will result​ ​from​ ​performing​ ​it. Modified​ ​Premise​ ​3*:​ ​For​ ​any​ ​atortural​ ​action​ ​realization​ ​there​ ​are​ ​normal​ ​conditions​ ​in which​ ​an​ ​agent​ ​holds​ ​every​ ​propositional​ ​attitude​ ​in​ ​the​ ​set​ ​and​ ​nonetheless​ ​believes that​ ​global​ ​torture​ ​will​ ​result​ ​from​ ​performing​ ​the​ ​action. We​ ​then​ ​conclude​ ​that​ ​atortural​ ​explanations​ ​are​ ​always​ ​incomplete.​ ​Perhaps​ ​we've​ ​just discovered​ ​a​ ​new​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​essentiality.​ ​In​ ​addition​ ​to​ ​indexical​ ​essentiality,​ ​there's​ ​also​ ​torturous essentiality.​ ​No​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​action​ ​without​ ​beliefs​ ​about​ ​torture.​ ​We​ ​would​ ​rather​ ​modus tollens​ ​on​ ​the​ ​implied​ ​conditional,​ ​and​ ​conclude​ ​that​ ​neither​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​attitude​ ​is​ ​essential, because​ ​both​ ​cases​ ​are​ ​abnormal.​ ​But​ ​for​ ​those​ ​not​ ​convinced,​ ​we​ ​note​ ​that​ ​the​ ​new essentiality​ ​argument​ ​is​ ​very​ ​powerful.​ ​Take​ ​any​ ​belief​ ​B​ ​of​ ​Alex's.​ ​If​ ​Alex​ ​believed​ ​that​ ​if​ ​B​ ​and she​ ​lifts​ ​the​ ​glass,​ ​then​ ​everyone​ ​on​ ​earth​ ​will​ ​be​ ​tortured,​ ​then​ ​she​ ​will​ ​not​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​action. So​ ​for​ ​any​ ​B-free​ ​action​ ​rationalization,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​find​ ​a​ ​B-containing​ ​expansion​ ​of​ ​it​ ​that​ ​blocks realization​ ​of​ ​the​ ​action.​ ​If​ ​that​ ​expansion​ ​is​ ​normal,​ ​then​ ​the​ ​B-free​ ​rationalization​ ​will​ ​be incomplete. Third​ ​Reply:​ ​Neutrality​ ​on​ ​indexical​ ​matters​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​threat​ ​to​ ​the​ ​completeness​ ​of​ ​action rationalizations. We​ ​have​ ​now​ ​rejected​ ​Bermúdez's​ ​IICa​ ​twice​ ​over.​ ​We​ ​thus​ ​don't​ ​think​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​any incompleteness​ ​in​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalizations​ ​to​ ​be​ ​repaired.​ ​As​ ​mentioned​ ​above, Bermúdez​ ​proceeds​ ​to​ ​reject​ ​one​ ​specific​ ​strategy​ ​for​ ​providing​ ​(unnecessary,​ ​in​ ​our​ ​view) repair​ ​for​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalizations.​ ​We​ ​briefly​ ​discuss​ ​this​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​Bermúdez's response​ ​to​ ​show​ ​that​ ​no​ ​plausible​ ​separate​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​essential​ ​indexicality​ ​can​ ​be extracted​ ​from​ ​it. Call​ ​an​ ​impersonal​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​​indexically​ ​neutral​​ ​if​ ​it​ ​not​ ​only​ ​does​ ​not​ ​cite​ ​any indexical​ ​attitudes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​acting​ ​agent,​ ​but​ ​actually​ ​requires​ ​that​ ​the​ ​acting​ ​agent​ ​be​ ​neutral​ ​on 23 all​ ​indexical​ ​matters​ ​(neither​ ​believing​ ​nor​ ​disbelieving​ ​them).​ ​Bermúdez​ ​suggests​ ​that indexically​ ​neutral​ ​action​ ​rationalizations​ ​cannot​ ​explain​ ​action: If​ ​it​ ​has​ ​never​ ​occurred​ ​to​ ​the​ ​agent​ ​that​ ​she​ ​might​ ​be​ ​phi,​ ​why​ ​on​ ​earth​ ​would​ ​she​ ​act upon​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​propositional​ ​attitudes​ ​conceptualized​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​phi?​ ​If​ ​it​ ​has​ ​never occurred​ ​to​ ​me​ ​that​ ​I​ ​might​ ​have​ ​won​ ​the​ ​raffle,​ ​why​ ​would​ ​I​ ​go​ ​to​ ​collect​ ​the​ ​prize? (Bermúdez​ ​2017:xx) This​ ​consideration,​ ​of​ ​course,​ ​has​ ​potential​ ​force​ ​only​ ​against​ ​subject-referring​ ​action rationalizations.​ ​But​ ​even​ ​when​ ​directed​ ​against​ ​subject-referring​ ​rationalizations,​ ​we​ ​are unconvinced.​ ​We​ ​can​ ​ask​ ​the​ ​same​ ​questions​ ​about​ ​no-torture​ ​beliefs.​ ​Suppose​ ​Alex​ ​neither believes​ ​nor​ ​disbelieves​ ​that​ ​if​ ​she​ ​lifts​ ​the​ ​glass,​ ​there​ ​will​ ​be​ ​global​ ​torture.​ ​Why​ ​would​ ​that make​ ​it​ ​mysterious​ ​that​ ​she​ ​then​ ​act​ ​upon​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​propositional​ ​attitudes​ ​conceptualized​ ​in terms​ ​of​ ​glass​ ​lifting?​ ​There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​grip​ ​to​ ​the​ ​question:​ ​​if​ ​it​ ​has​ ​never​ ​occurred​ ​to​ ​Alex​ ​that​ ​if​ ​she lifts​ ​the​ ​glass,​ ​there​ ​might​ ​or​ ​might​ ​not​ ​be​ ​global​ ​torture,​ ​why​ ​would​ ​she​ ​lift​ ​the​ ​glass?​​ ​There​ ​is no​ ​reason​ ​for​ ​Alex​ ​to​ ​entertain​ ​global​ ​torturing​ ​contingencies​ ​in​ ​getting​ ​her​ ​thirst​ ​and​ ​glass beliefs​ ​coordinated​ ​into​ ​action​ ​--​ ​she's​ ​just​ ​not​ ​built​ ​to​ ​need​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​(without​ ​special prompting)​ ​those​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​alternatives.​ ​And​ ​things​ ​could​ ​easily​ ​be​ ​the​ ​same​ ​way​ ​with​ ​us.​ ​We don't​ ​need​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​whether​ ​we​ ​are​ ​the​ ​owners​ ​of​ ​the​ ​body​ ​parts​ ​we​ ​see​ ​about​ ​us​ ​to​ ​use beliefs​ ​and​ ​desires​ ​about​ ​those​ ​body​ ​parts​ ​to​ ​get​ ​us​ ​into​ ​action​ ​--​ ​we're​ ​just​ ​not​ ​built​ ​to​ ​consider (without​ ​special​ ​prompting)​ ​those​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​alternatives. So​ ​we​ ​don't​ ​see​ ​any​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​any​ ​special​ ​role​ ​for​ ​indexical​ ​attitudes​ ​here. There​ ​are​ ​infinitely​ ​many​ ​propositions,​ ​drawing​ ​on​ ​every​ ​possible​ ​conceptual​ ​resource,​ ​that​ ​are potential​ ​barriers​ ​to​ ​realization​ ​of​ ​action.​ ​It​ ​can't​ ​be​ ​right​ ​that​ ​​all​​ ​of​ ​those​ ​propositions​ ​are essential​ ​to​ ​action​ ​rationalization​ ​(either​ ​to​ ​block​ ​their​ ​negations,​ ​or​ ​to​ ​block​ ​indifference​ ​with respect​ ​to​ ​them).​ ​We've​ ​been​ ​given​ ​no​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​the​ ​right​ ​thing​ ​to​ ​say​ ​about​ ​these infinitely​ ​many​ ​other​ ​cases​ ​doesn't​ ​extend​ ​equally​ ​well​ ​to​ ​indexical​ ​cases. A​ ​Diagnosis​ ​Of​ ​Why​ ​Our​ ​Opponents​ ​Won't​ ​be​ ​Convinced The​ ​reactions​ ​to​ ​our​ ​book​ ​have​ ​struck​ ​us​ ​as​ ​interesting​ ​in​ ​at​ ​least​ ​two​ ​ways:​ ​First,​ ​we've​ ​been encouraged​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​defenses​ ​of​ ​Essential​ ​Indexicality​ ​have​ ​been​ ​(i)​ ​varied,​ ​and​ ​(ii) have​ ​not​ ​appealed​ ​to​ ​arguments​ ​in​ ​the​ ​original​ ​literature.​ ​We​ ​had​ ​a​ ​slight​ ​worry,​ ​having​ ​finished the​ ​book,​ ​that​ ​there​ ​was​ ​some​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​obvious​ ​point​ ​out​ ​there​ ​that​ ​we​ ​had​ ​overlooked​ ​or​ ​failed to​ ​grasp​ ​that​ ​the​ ​essential​ ​indexicality​ ​proponents​ ​would​ ​all​ ​converge​ ​on.​ ​However,​ ​a)​ ​no​ ​such convergence​ ​has​ ​occurred,​ ​b)​ ​no​ ​one​ ​has​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​we​ ​fail​ ​to​ ​respond​ ​to​ ​the​ ​articulated arguments​ ​in​ ​the​ ​literature​ ​that​ ​existed​ ​before​ ​our​ ​book,​ ​and​ ​c)​ ​all​ ​the​ ​responses​ ​have​ ​been different.​ ​That,​ ​to​ ​us,​ ​indicates​ ​that​ ​there​ ​weren't​ ​any​ ​good​ ​arguments​ ​for​ ​essential​ ​indexicality, i.e.​ ​that​ ​our​ ​conclusion​ ​was​ ​right. 24 The​ ​second​ ​thing​ ​that​ ​has​ ​struck​ ​us​ ​is​ ​that​ ​no​ ​one​ ​in​ ​the​ ​essential​ ​indexicality​ ​camp​ ​seems​ ​to have​ ​changed​ ​their​ ​mind.​ ​They​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​think​ ​of​ ​us​ ​as​ ​sceptics​ ​who​ ​throw​ ​up​ ​weird​ ​sceptical scenarios​ ​that​ ​are​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​refute,​ ​but​ ​don't​ ​convince.There's​ ​a​ ​spectacularly​ ​strong​ ​attachment to​ ​the​ ​significance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​first​ ​person​ ​perspective​ ​and​ ​a​ ​very​ ​strong​ ​reluctance​ ​to​ ​take​ ​de​ ​se skepticism​ ​seriously.​ ​We​ ​will​ ​end​ ​with​ ​some​ ​brief​ ​reflections​ ​on​ ​why​ ​the​ ​de​ ​se​ ​has​ ​such​ ​a​ ​firm grip​ ​on​ ​many​ ​thinkers​ ​-​ ​why​ ​essential​ ​indexicality​ ​is​ ​an​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​strikes​ ​many​ ​so​ ​obviously​ ​right that​ ​hardly​ ​any​ ​arguments​ ​can​ ​shake​ ​their​ ​conviction.​ ​We​ ​suspect​ ​that​ ​at​ ​least​ ​three​ ​factors​ ​play a​ ​role: (i)​ ​​Obsession​ ​with​ ​Misidentification​ ​Cases​:​ ​We​ ​find​ ​that​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​arguments​ ​just​ ​keep returning​ ​to​ ​the​ ​misidentification​ ​cases.​ ​We'll​ ​present​ ​an​ ​argument​ ​against​ ​a​ ​reply​ ​that​ ​has nothing​ ​specifically​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​misidentification,​ ​but​ ​at​ ​the​ ​end,​ ​the​ ​respondent​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to the​ ​question:​ ​"Well,​ ​but​ ​what​ ​if​ ​I​ ​make​ ​it​ ​into​ ​a​ ​misidentification​ ​case,​ ​what​ ​do​ ​you​ ​say​ ​then?" Here,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​reminder,​ ​is​ ​how​ ​that​ ​discussion​ ​will​ ​go: We​: Well,​ ​our​ ​case​ ​​isn't​​ ​a​ ​misidentification​ ​case. Opponent​: Okay,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​​could​​ ​have​ ​been​ ​one. We​: Right,​ ​but​ ​that's​ ​another​ ​case,​ ​our​ ​case​ ​doesn't​ ​involve​ ​any​ ​kind​ ​of identity​ ​confusion.​ ​Look,​ ​for​ ​the​ ​sake​ ​of​ ​argument​ ​we'll​ ​grant​ ​you​ ​that​ ​identity​ ​confusions will​ ​affect​ ​action​ ​explanation​ ​in​ ​various​ ​interesting​ ​ways.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​just​ ​need​ ​​one​ ​single case​ ​where​ ​there's​ ​no​ ​de​ ​se​ ​content​ ​involved​ ​and​ ​​we​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​cases​ ​where the​ ​agents​ ​have​ ​no​ ​identity​ ​confusion​. Maybe​ ​a​ ​source​ ​of​ ​the​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​putting​ ​aside​ ​cases​ ​that​ ​involve​ ​identity​ ​confusion​ ​is​ ​the thought​ ​that​ ​if​ ​Susan​ ​is​ ​not​ ​identity​ ​confused​ ​-​ ​i.e.​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​​I'm​ ​not​ ​Susan​ ​-​​ ​then​ ​she​ ​must believe​ ​another​ ​de​ ​se​ ​content:​ ​​ ​​I​ ​am​ ​Susan​.​ ​So,​ ​maybe​ ​the​ ​thought​ ​is,​ ​if​ ​she​ ​doesn't​ ​believe​ ​​I'm not​ ​Susan​,​ ​then​ ​she​ ​must​ ​believe​ ​​I​ ​am​ ​Susan​.​ ​One​ ​of​ ​these​ ​​must​​ ​play​ ​a​ ​role​ ​in​ ​the​ ​action explanation/rationalization.​ ​But​ ​this,​ ​as​ ​we​ ​saw​ ​in​ ​the​ ​reply​ ​to​ ​Bermúdez,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​mistake​ ​-​ ​Susan don't​ ​need​ ​to​ ​believe​ ​either​ ​​I'm​ ​Susan​​ ​or​ ​​I'm​ ​not​ ​Susan​ ​​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​act.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​cases​ ​we​ ​imagine, neither​ ​of​ ​these​ ​play​ ​a​ ​role.​ ​In​ ​response​ ​to​ ​this​ ​we​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​get​ ​just​ ​a​ ​brute​ ​insistence​ ​that​ ​it​ ​​must​, but​ ​that's​ ​where​ ​the​ ​arguments​ ​run​ ​out​ ​(or​ ​they​ ​turn​ ​into​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​arguments​ ​above​ ​-​ ​and​ ​then those​ ​arguments​ ​can't​ ​return​ ​to​ ​misidentification​ ​data​ ​alone.) (ii)​ ​​The​ ​Multiplicity​ ​of​ ​Argumentative​ ​Avenues​:​ ​We​ ​started​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical​​ ​by​ ​noting that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​many​ ​different​ ​ways​ ​to​ ​argue​ ​for​ ​an​ ​essential​ ​indexicality​ ​thesis.​ ​Some​ ​arguments have​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​agency,​ ​some​ ​have​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​semantics​ ​and​ ​opacity,​ ​some​ ​have​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with epistemology​ ​and​ ​others​ ​again​ ​with​ ​perception.​ ​And​ ​that's​ ​not​ ​an​ ​exhaustive​ ​list.​ ​For​ ​example, in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​our​ ​book,​ ​L.A.​ ​Paul​ ​has​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​we've​ ​looked​ ​at​ ​the​ ​wrong​ ​motivation: empathy​ ​is​ ​the​ ​important​ ​phenomenon​ ​to​ ​focus​ ​on,​ ​she​ ​says​ ​(Paul​ ​2017,​ ​Cappelen​ ​and​ ​Dever 2017).​ ​In​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical​I,​ ​we​ ​take​ ​several​ ​of​ ​these​ ​arguments​ ​on​ ​one​ ​by​ ​one​ ​and show​ ​that​ ​they​ ​fail.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​is​ ​that​ ​if​ ​the​ ​focus​ ​is​ ​on​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​argument,​ ​then​ ​it will​ ​always​ ​seem​ ​that​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​others​ ​can​ ​pick​ ​up​ ​the​ ​slack,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​there's​ ​a​ ​tendency​ ​to gradually​ ​sneak​ ​over​ ​to​ ​another​ ​arguments​ ​when​ ​one​ ​starts​ ​crumbling.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​what​ ​we 25 say​ ​about​ ​the​ ​irrelevance​ ​of​ ​identity​ ​confusion​ ​for​ ​explaining​ ​action​ ​doesn't​ ​explain​ ​opacity​ ​and the​ ​failure​ ​of​ ​substitutivity​ ​that​ ​will​ ​arise.​ ​That's​ ​a​ ​separate​ ​argument​ ​and​ ​it's​ ​tempting​ ​for​ ​de​ ​se proponents​ ​to​ ​slide​ ​over​ ​to​ ​it.​ ​What​ ​this​ ​shows​ ​is​ ​that​ ​to​ ​become​ ​a​ ​de​ ​se​ ​skeptic​ ​takes​ ​a​ ​lot​ ​of work:​ ​you​ ​have​ ​to​ ​convince​ ​yourself​ ​that​ ​all​ ​these​ ​pillars​ ​crumble​ ​and​ ​since​ ​each​ ​of​ ​the​ ​pillars have​ ​the​ ​weight​ ​of​ ​both​ ​tradition​ ​and​ ​authority​ ​behind​ ​it,​ ​it's​ ​easy​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​that​ ​the​ ​whole framework​ ​is​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​liberate​ ​oneself​ ​from.​ ​In​ ​sum:​ ​De​ ​se​ ​scepticism​ ​is​ ​hard​ ​work,​ ​but​ ​since​ ​it​ ​is true,​ ​and​ ​its​ ​truth​ ​is​ ​significant,​ ​it's​ ​worth​ ​it. (iii)​ ​Finally,​ ​our​ ​opponents​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​retreat​ ​to​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​we're​ ​attacking​ ​a​ ​straw-woman​ ​or man.​ ​The​ ​strong​ ​modal​ ​claim,​ ​they​ ​say,​ ​is​ ​too​ ​strong.​ ​What​ ​proponents​ ​of​ ​essential​ ​indexicality had​ ​or​ ​should​ ​have​ ​had​ ​in​ ​mind​ ​is​ ​that​ ​contingent​ ​features​ ​of​ ​actual​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​make​ ​it​ ​the case​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have​ ​to​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​de​ ​se​ ​contents.​ ​This​ ​isn't​ ​an​ ​essential​ ​feature​ ​of​ ​agency​ ​-​ ​it's​ ​an empirical​ ​claim​ ​about​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​and​ ​the​ ​way​ ​they​ ​happen​ ​to​ ​act.​ ​In​ ​​The​ ​Inessential Indexical​I​ ​we​ ​give​ ​two​ ​responses​ ​to​ ​this​ ​objection.​ ​First,​ ​we​ ​prove​ ​that​ ​the​ ​stronger​ ​claim​ ​has been​ ​repeatedly​ ​defended​ ​and​ ​relied​ ​on​ ​in​ ​the​ ​literature​ ​(so​ ​we​ ​are​ ​not​ ​misrepresenting​ ​the​ ​view -​ ​the​ ​thesis​ ​we​ ​attack​ ​is​ ​the​ ​thesis​ ​that​ ​has​ ​been​ ​repeatedly​ ​proposed).​ ​Second,​ ​an​ ​argument for​ ​the​ ​weaker​ ​claim​ ​would​ ​have​ ​to​ ​based​ ​on​ ​empirical​ ​research​ ​into​ ​human​ ​agency,​ ​not armchair​ ​reflection: Whether​ ​indexicality​ ​(or​ ​"the​ ​​de​ ​se​")​ ​is​ ​involved​ ​is​ ​a​ ​very,​ ​very​ ​detailed​ ​question​ ​about the​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​complicated​ ​mechanisms​ ​in​ ​the​ ​human​ ​head.​ ​Armchair​ ​reflections about​ ​us​ ​moving​ ​our​ ​fingers​ ​won't​ ​get​ ​us​ ​such​ ​conclusions;​ ​nor​ ​will​ ​philosophical reflections​ ​about​ ​generalizations​ ​or​ ​opacity.​ ​In​ ​saying​ ​this​ ​we​ ​are​ ​not​ ​taking​ ​a​ ​stand​ ​on how​ ​action​ ​mechanisms​ ​are​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​implemented​ ​in​ ​human​ ​heads.​ ​It​ ​would​ ​be​ ​absurd​ ​for us​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​such​ ​a​ ​complicated​ ​empirical​ ​issue​ ​can​ ​be​ ​settled​ ​that​ ​way.​ ​We're​ ​just saying​ ​that​ ​our​ ​opponents​ ​don't​ ​know​ ​how​ ​the​ ​implementation​ ​goes,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are feasible​ ​non-indexical​ ​implementations. We​ ​stand​ ​by​ ​these​ ​two​ ​components​ ​of​ ​the​ ​reply.​ ​One​ ​point​ ​we​ ​didn't​ ​elaborate​ ​on​ ​in​ ​the​ ​book was​ ​the​ ​last​ ​conjunct​ ​of​ ​that​ ​passage.​ ​Here​ ​we've​ ​provided​ ​some​ ​further​ ​elaboration.​ ​We continue​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​armchair​ ​speculation​ ​into​ ​these​ ​complicated​ ​empirical​ ​matters​ ​should​ ​be treated​ ​with​ ​caution​ ​and​ ​suspicion.​ ​But​ ​if​ ​people​ ​want​ ​to​ ​play​ ​the​ ​armchair​ ​speculation​ ​game, we're​ ​willing​ ​to​ ​play​ ​it​ ​too,​ ​and​ ​we've​ ​attempted​ ​here,​ ​by​ ​setting​ ​out​ ​some​ ​possible​ ​non-indexical implementations​ ​in​ ​more​ ​detail,​ ​to​ ​show​ ​why​ ​we​ ​think​ ​it's​ ​compelling​ ​not​ ​just​ ​that​ ​it's​ ​​possible​​ ​for there​ ​to​ ​be​ ​creatures​ ​like​ ​that,​ ​but​ ​that​ ​we​ ​ourselves​ ​are​ ​creatures​ ​that​ ​often​ ​act​ ​without​ ​any indexical​ ​thoughts. References Bermúdez,​ ​Luis​ ​Jose.​ ​2017.​ ​Understanding​ ​'I':​ ​Language​ ​And​ ​Thought.​ ​Oxford:​ ​OUP. Cappelen,​ ​Herman​ ​&​ ​Dever,​ ​Josh​ ​(2017).​ ​Empathy​ ​and​ ​transformative​ ​experience​ ​without​ ​the​ ​first person​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view.​ ​​Inquiry​​ ​60​ ​(3):315-336. Paul,​ ​L.​ ​A.​ ​(2017).​ ​First​ ​personal​ ​modes​ ​of​ ​presentation​ ​and​ ​the​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​empathy.​ ​​Inquiry​​ ​60 (3):189-207. 26 Cappelen,​ ​Herman​ ​&​ ​Dever,​ ​Josh​ ​(2013).​ ​​The​ ​Inessential​ ​Indexical:​ ​On​ ​the​ ​Philosophical Insignificance​ ​of​ ​Perspective​ ​and​ ​the​ ​First​ ​Person​.​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press. Ninan,​ ​Dilip​ ​(2016).​ ​What​ ​is​ ​the​ ​Problem​ ​of​ ​De​ ​Se​ ​Attitudes?​ ​In​ ​Stephan​ ​Torre​ ​&​ ​Manuel Garcia-Carpintero​ ​(eds.),​ ​​About​ ​Oneself:​ ​De​ ​Se​ ​Thought​ ​and​ ​Communication​.​ ​Oxford​ ​University Press.